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This dissertation is a collection of three essays that examine how political economy and 
institutional factors influence development outcomes. In Chapter 1, I introduce each essay and 
argue that it is important to incorporate political economy and institutional considerations into 
studies in development economics. Chapter 2 examines the political economy of development in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo by assessing the impact of conflict and local insecurity on 
household-level economic conditions across the country. Chapter 3 analyzes the political 
economy of infant mortality rates across the developing world by using an usually large micro-
level dataset for 70 developing countries. Chapter 4 assesses the political economy of economic 
reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq by highlighting four ‘reconstruction traps’ that result from 
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1.1   Political Economy and Development 
 
Economists have long studied the political economy of development. More than two and 
a half centuries ago, Adam Smith wrote that “little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest 
degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable 
administration of justice…” and that “all the rest are [brought] about by the natural course of 
things” (Smith, 1776: xl). Yet the roles played by political economy and institutional factors in 
the process of economic development remain understudied by scholars, policymakers, and aid 
professionals. While Smith’s insights into the political economy of development are powerful 
ones, many questions in this research area remain unanswered. Further, many of the standard 
‘answers’ in the literature (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson [2001] on the role of 
institutions in explaining cross-country variation in economic performance) are the subject of 
considerable debate.
1
   
The goal of this dissertation is to contribute to the fast-growing literature on political 
economy and development by examining how specific political economy and institutional factors 
influence economic and health outcomes across the developing world. To this end, I introduce 
political economy considerations into the analysis of household living conditions and durable 
ownership, infant mortality rates across countries, and externally-led efforts at economic 
                                                 
1
 For instance, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004) argue that human capital matters more for 
growth than institutions and that institutions are actually the outcome of better policies and economic growth.  
2 
 
reconstruction and state building.
2
 All too often, each of these topics is approached without a 
consideration of political economy constraints or the incentives faced by different political 
actors. It is highly worthwhile to test whether there are political economy factors that shape 
important economic and health outcomes (like household-level wealth, infant mortality, or even 
entire economic institutions). In what follows, I introduce the three essays in this dissertation and 
discuss their main findings and implications. 
 
1.2   Conflict and Development: Evidence from the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 
 
Much of the recent literature on the political economy of development has focused on 
how cross-country variation in the protection of private property rights or rule of law accounts 
for why some countries are rich while other countries are poor.
3
 Empirically, those countries 
with poorly enforced private property rights have worse development outcomes than those 
countries with relatively more secure property rights (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson, 2005). The same is true for economic freedom: those countries that are 
relatively more economically free have higher rates of economic growth and higher levels of 
income per person (see Chauffour, 2011 for a review of this literature).  
Much of this literature focuses on the role of institutions in explaining cross-country 
variation in economic performance in a large-N framework. Increasingly, economists are 
exploring the implications of within-country variation in property rights protection for economic 
performance.  
                                                 
2
 This follows Acemoglu’s (2010) call for the inclusion of political economy factors in inquiries into development 
problems and Besley and Persson’s (2011) contributions on the political economy of development.  
3
 Of course, economists have long focused on the importance of private property rights for economic growth and 
development (see, for instance, Smith [1776] and Mises [1920]).   
3 
 
The first essay in this dissertation examines how conflict exposure has influenced 
household asset ownership and living conditions across the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC).
4
 The DRC has experienced ongoing political instability and violent conflict for almost 
two decades, yet the causes and economic consequences of conflict in the DRC have received 
relatively little attention from the academic community.
5
 I employ micro-data from the 2007 
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) for the DRC along with disaggregated and geo-
referenced information on regional conflict exposure from the Peace Research Institute Oslo 
(PRIO) to examine the microeconomic consequences of conflict in the DRC. 
Because conflict events were not randomly assigned across the country, I use two 
different instrumental variables approaches, both which rely on plausibly exogenous geographic 
and historical factors for identification. In line with many qualitative reports on the topic, I find 
evidence of a strong, negative impact of conflict exposure on household-level economic 
outcomes in the DRC. This finding is robust to the inclusion of different control variables, 
definitions of conflict exposure and household-level ‘wealth,’ and sample restrictions. The 
results indicate that political economy factors—here, ongoing political instability and violent 
conflict—have had substantial impacts on development outcomes across the country. This paper 
contributes to the literature on the influence of the rule of law and security of property rights by 
identifying how regional differences in the degree to which property is secure from expropriation 
or exposure to ongoing conflict influence regional economic outcomes. 
 
                                                 
4
 See Figure A.1 in the Appendix.  
5
 Because most economic data from the DRC are highly unreliable, there have only been a few studies that address 
development outcomes within the country. 
4 
 
1.3   Infant Mortality over the Electoral Cycle 
Recently, a number of studies have shown that infant mortality rates across the 
developing world are highly sensitive to fluctuations in aggregate income, changes in weather 
patterns and disease ecology, and commodity prices. To date, only a few studies have explored 
whether changes in political economy factors similarly influence infant mortality. In essence, we 
have a growing body of evidence regarding the importance of economic and environmental 
‘shocks’ for infant mortality rates, but there is less of an understanding of how political economy 
‘shocks’ similarly affect infant mortality rates.  
The second essay in this dissertation introduces political economy ‘shocks’ into the 
analysis of infant mortality fluctuations. Specifically, this essay tests whether infant mortality 
rates fluctuate in the vicinity of elections. This article therefore contributes to our understanding 
of the political economy of infant mortality rates and expands the literatures on political business 
cycles and political budget cycles by considering for the first time whether infant mortality rates 
similarly fluctuate along the electoral cycle.  
To answer this question, I use a large panel (more than 2 million observations) of 
individual-level indicators of infant mortality and other covariates. Using a variety of 
specifications, I find only limited evidence of electoral cyclicality in infant mortality rates. This 
result holds even when considering the heterogeneous timing of elections and infant birth dates. 
Ultimately, while it is likely that there is electoral cyclicality in transfer payments and 
government expenditures in a number of developing countries, there is only limited evidence of 




1.4   Economic Reconstruction Amidst Conflict: Insights from Afghanistan 
and Iraq 
As Buchanan (1975) argued in The Limits of Liberty, the core responsibilities of the state 
are to enforce constitutional order (the ‘protective’ role of the state) and provide public goods 
(the ‘productive’ role of the state). Yet all too often states fulfill neither of these roles and instead 
engage in what Buchanan called the ‘predatory’ functions of the state. Where states are 
characterized by persistent weakness or state institutions have entirely collapsed (e.g., in places 
like Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, etc.), public goods like 
security and the rule of law are systematically underprovided. Sub-national non-state armed 
groups maintain considerable control over different regions of a country and often operate with 
impunity.
6
 The national armies in these countries are also poorly controlled and in places like the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo we observe human rights abuses by members of these armies.  
It is well-acknowledged that state failure has severe consequences for an array of 
economic and health outcomes.  Rotberg (2004: 6) argues the following: 
In most failed states, regimes prey on their own constituents. Driven by ethnic or 
other intercommunal hostility, or by the governing elite’s insecurities, they 
victimize their own citizens or some subset of the whole that is regarded as 
hostile. As in Mobutu Sese Seko’s Zaire or the Taliban’s Afghanistan, ruling 
cadres increasingly oppress, extort, and harass the majority of their own 
compatriots while privileging a more narrowly based party, clan, or sect. 
 
Taking this political status quo as given, many policymakers have sought solutions to these 
pressing problems. Yet state building and economic reconstruction are time- and resource-
intensive endeavors that are beset by many problems of informational limitations and incentive 
compatibility (Coyne and Pellillo, 2011a).  
                                                 
6
 Then again, in places like Somaliland, the quasi-governments that have emerged actually fulfill the protective and 
productive roles of the state better than in other areas of the country (e.g., Mogadishu).  
6 
 
The last essay in this dissertation applies the tools of public choice economics to 
economic reconstruction and state building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Specifically, the 
incentives and constraints faced by those involved in these processes are mapped out and four 
‘reconstruction traps’ are identified. The ‘traps’ are much like others that are discussed in the 
literature (e.g., ‘poverty traps,’ ‘conflict traps,’ etc.) but are more oriented toward the potential 
policy traps in which the international community often becomes entangled. These 
reconstruction traps include (1) the credible commitment trap, (2) the knowledge trap, (3) the 
political economy trap, and (4) the bureaucracy trap. A number of examples and insights from 
Afghanistan and Iraq are used to motivate and elucidate the reconstruction traps.  
While the consequences of state failure or state weakness for development outcomes are 
severe (as illustrated in the first essay of this dissertation), these reconstruction traps suggest that 
the capacity for the international community to intervene and ‘fix’ failed states is limited.  
 
1.5   Contributions 
Each of these three essays introduces political economy and institutional considerations into the 
analysis of development processes and outcomes. Given the consequences of political economy 




Chapter 2  
 
Conflict and Development – Evidence from the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo 
 
 
2.1   Introduction 
 
In the wake of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
experienced two devastating civil wars. The 2
nd
 civil war in particular was associated with the 
deaths of millions of civilians, widespread internal displacement, severe human rights abuses, 
and the destruction of infrastructure, homes, and physical and human capital.
7
 During the civil 
wars, schools and hospitals were attacked by rebel groups and capital assets were expropriated 
by armed groups and government troops (Global Witness, 2009; OHCHR, 2010). In the eastern 
province of North Kivu, over the course of three years following the Rwandan genocide, it is 
estimated that up to 80 percent of the livestock were pillaged by rebel groups (OHCHR, 2010). 
Civil conflict and attacks on civilians continue to date, particularly in the eastern and 
northeastern provinces of the country.  
 While a number of studies have discussed some of the economic consequences of conflict 
in the DRC (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002; Nest et al., 2006; Turner, 2007; Global Witness, 2009; 
Prunier, 2009; OHCHR, 2010; Autesserre, 2010, Stearns, 2011), to date there has not been a 
systematic empirical analysis of the impact of conflict on economic conditions across the 
country. This paper expands the literature on the topic by examining how conflict events (i.e., 
‘battles’ or ‘attacks’) have influenced household-level measures of durable ownership and living 
                                                 
7
 Most of these civilian deaths were related to malnutrition, public health crises, and general economic decline 
(Turner, 2007).  The International Rescue Committee (IRC, 2004) estimates a death toll of nearly 3.8 million for the 
second civil war alone, though this estimate is the subject of debate (Human Security Report Project [2010]).  
8 
 
conditions across the country. More generally, this paper assesses the importance of local and 
regional political economy factors for economic development. It is well-acknowledged that the 
rule of law and security of person and property are crucial for economic growth and development 
(Haggard and Tiede, 2011). Yet few papers explicitly focus on the implications of local and 
regional variation in the support for the rule of law or the security of person and property for 
household-level economic outcomes.  
While there is an extensive literature on the country-level institutional determinants of 
economic growth and development (see, among others, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 
2001; Rodrik et al., 2004; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Haggard and Tiede, 2011), there is also 
a fast-growing literature on the local and regional political economy of microeconomic 
outcomes.  Recent studies of the microeconomic consequences of conflict address the impact of 
conflict and political instability on human capital accumulation (Akresh and de Walque, 2010; 
Shemyakina, 2011; Chamarbagwala and Morn, 2011), local institutions (Bellows and Miguel, 
2006; 2009), political participation (Blattman, 2009; Kyle, 2010), labor market outcomes 
(Kondylis, 2010), and health outcomes (Bundervoet, Verwimp, and Akresh, 2009; Akresh, 
Verwimp, and Bundervoet, 2011; Akresh, Bhalotra, Leone, and Osili, 2011; Minoiu and 
Shemyakina, 2012).  
The importance of understanding the implications of conflict and insecurity for 
development cannot be understated. While the impact of conflict on development in the DRC 
may appear straightforward—Collier et al. (2003), for instance, refer to civil war as 
‘development in reverse’—there is reason to believe the empirical relationship between conflict 
events and economic outcomes may be somewhat ambiguous. Consider that Hegre, Østend, and 
Raleigh (2009) find that conflict events during the 1989-2002 Liberian civil war took place more 
9 
 
frequently in relatively wealthier areas of the country, a result that is consistent with the results 
of Collier and Hoeffler (2004) which suggest that ‘rebel opportunity’ partially explains why civil 
war occurs. Blattman and Miguel (2010) also point out that while the correlation between low 
per capita incomes and the onset of conflict is one of the strongest in the empirical literature on 
conflict, it is highly likely the relationship between the two moves in both directions:  low 
incomes may set the underlying conditions that increase the likelihood of conflict (perhaps 
because of weak state capacity, as argued by Fearon and Laitin, 2003, or because of rebel 
opportunity, as argued by Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), yet conflict is also associated with the 
destruction of resources, loss of life, and widespread displacement.
8
 These studies suggest that 
OLS estimates of the impact of conflict on development in the DRC may be biased.  
To shed light on the impact of conflict and local insecurity on economic conditions across 
the DRC, I combine household-level data on durable ownership and living conditions from the 
2007 Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) with disaggregated and geo-referenced conflict 
data from the Armed Conflict and Location Event Dataset (ACLED). Because conflict events 
were not randomly assigned across the country, I use the variation in distances between DHS 
cluster locations (the latitude and longitude coordinates at which surveys were administered) and 
Goma, a city along the DRC-Rwanda border, as an instrument for conflict exposure. This 
instrument accounts for the fact that conflict events have taken place at a much higher rate in the 
eastern and northeastern provinces. Accounting for the distribution and intensity of conflict 
events across the country helps to isolate the effect of conflict on development in the DRC, yet 
this approach is not without its limitations. In Section 6, I discuss different strategies for 
identifying the relationship between conflict and development.  
                                                 
8
 Do and Iyer (2010) also examine violent conflict in Nepal, finding an association between high levels of poverty 
and conflict intensity.   
10 
 
I find that the conflict events that have taken place in the DRC have had a significant 
negative impact on household-level economic outcomes. Violent political activity is associated 
with strong reductions in durable ownership and household living conditions. These results are 
similar when different specifications and variable definitions and sources are considered. The 
findings illustrate the importance of understanding the incentives faced by different political 
actors (e.g. governments, rebel organizations, local militias, citizens, etc.) in ‘weak’ and ‘fragile’ 
states.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the recent economic 
and political history of the DRC. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 presents the 
identification strategy. Section 5 presents the results while Section 6 assesses their robustness to 
alternative specifications, variable definitions, and variable sources. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.2   Recent History 
 
In this section, I summarize the recent political and economic history of the DRC. To be certain, 
the extraction-oriented institutions that were established under King Leopold II, the country’s 
history of colonial rule by Belgium, and post-independence political instability played 
substantive roles in shaping the political and economic status quo we observe today. Yet I focus 
primarily on the most recent political and economic history of the DRC in order to establish the 
context for the empirical analysis in the following sections. 
Prior to the overthrow of President Mobutu Sese Seko’s regime (which lasted from 1965-
1997), the economic and political status quo in the DRC (then Zaire) was characterized by weak 
constraints on executive authority, endemic corruption and extensive patronage networks, 
hyperinflation, low agricultural and industrial productivity, and weak state financial capacity 
11 
 
(Prunier, 2009). Mobutu’s rule was associated with sharp economic decline and the deterioration 
of state institutions.   
In the early 1990s, Mobutu’s regime and patronage network declined rapidly, particularly 
when Cold War-era economic and military aid from the United States came to a near stop.
9
 Land 
disputes and conflicts related to citizenship rights (which resulted from legal changes in 
Kinshasa) erupted during this time period, particularly in the eastern provinces of the country 
(Autesserre, 2010). The expropriation of household durables also began during this time period. 
Autesserre (2010: 56) describes how “instead of paying his armed forces, Mobutu encouraged 
them to remunerate themselves through looting the scapegoats’ properties—in addition to 
conducting clandestine trade and attacking humanitarian aid assets.” The ineffectiveness of the 
state was particularly evident in the eastern provinces of the DRC. Prior to his regime’s collapse, 
in the 1980s Mobutu cut expenditures on public goods (e.g. health care, education, and 
infrastructure) in the region, although tax rates remained high (Autesserre, 2010: 70).
10
   
During this period of economic and institutional decline in Zaire, the Rwandan genocide 
took place in the spring of 1994. The genocide—perpetrated by génocidaires like the 
Interahamwe, the Hutu Power organization, and members of the former Forces Armées 
Rwandaises (FAR)—took the lives of more than 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus. The 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded from Uganda to seize the Rwandan capital, Kigali, and 
to stop the genocide. Many of the génocidaires took cover in refugee camps alongside more than 
one million refugees from Rwanda (and Burundi) that were situated in the eastern provinces of 
                                                 
9
 Remarkably, almost all U.S. economic and military aid to Zaire came to a stop at the end of the Cold War. Over 
the previous decade, the U.S. had provided Mobutu with hundreds of millions of dollars in economic and military 
aid (close to $991 million in the 1980s alone). No longer useful geopolitically toward the end of the Cold War, the 
United States even imposed sanctions on Mobutu’s regime to induce democratization. Mobutu responded 
accordingly, holding the first multiparty elections in the country in the early 1990s.   
10
 This is one of the motivations for using ‘education in years’ as a control variable in selected specifications below.  
12 
 
the DRC along the DRC-Rwanda border.  In September 1996, General Kagame of Rwanda sent 
a force supported by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) (formerly the RPF) into Zaire with the 
intent of neutralizing the génocidaires. The RPA did so in conjunction with the Uganda People’s 
Defense Force (UPDF) and other political organizations, which eventually led to the formation 
of the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL).   
Yet along with the desire to counter the génocidaires, there was also a broader goal of 
overthrowing Mobutu’s regime, mainly because of his reticence in countering armed groups that 
took refuge in some parts of the country. Prior to the invasion, the heads of state from Angola, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe were involved in plans for regime change 
(Prunier, 2009: 67). As Laurent-Désiré Kabila, the leader of the AFDL, marched across Zaire 
from the east, Mobutu and his top officers fled the country. Kabila arrived in Kinshasa on May 
20, 1997, ending the first civil war, and sought to establish political control over the capital. 
Kabila subsequently renamed the country from Zaire to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  
However, political alliances quickly changed. Kabila was no longer willing to attack the 
génocidaires and other groups Uganda and Rwanda perceived as threats. With Uganda and 
Rwanda no longer in support of Kabila, they sent troops, arms, and money into Zaire with the 
intent of toppling Kabila’s regime. Rebels backed by the RPA commandeered a cargo plane in 
Goma and flew to the Atlantic Coast to launch a military campaign (Nest et al., 2006: 25).
11
 With 
the splintering of rebel groups, the development of new alliances (e.g. many Interahamwe and 
ex-FAR troops jointed the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda [FDLR] and Uganda 
backed the Mouvement de Libération du Congo [MLC] and a faction of the RCD [different than 
the faction supported by Rwanda]) and the involvement of neighboring countries such as Angola, 
Chad, Eritrea, Namibia, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, the second civil war continued 
                                                 
11
 This explains why some of the conflict events took place near the DRC’s capital, Kinshasa (see below). 
13 
 
until mid-2003, when the Transitional Government in Kinshasa (the ‘Government of National 
Unity and Transition’) was established after a series of peace agreements and negotiations.
12
 The 
Transitional Government was comprised by some of the most powerful political groups, 
including Kabila’s former government and rebel movements-turned-political parties (e.g. the 
Ugandan-allied MLC, Mai Mai militias, and different Ugandan- and Rwandan-backed factions 
of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie [RCD], etc.) (Autesserre, 2010). The 
second civil war left a devastating death toll, with millions of casualties resulting mainly from 
malnutrition, public health crises, and generally poor living standards (IRC, 2004).  
While the transition to the new government occurred almost a decade ago, various armed 
groups, local militias, and the Congolese national army (FARDC) are still fighting in the eastern 
provinces of the DRC. Many armed groups continue to abuse citizens in these provinces, 
charging ‘taxes,’ engaging in atrocious human rights abuses and rapes, and expropriating 
household assets and consumer durables.
 13
 
The conflict events that continue to take place in the eastern provinces appear to center 
on disputes over natural, mineral, and land resources, though both the fundamental and 
proximate causes of the conflict events are complex and the source of considerable debate 
(Stearns, 2011). Nest et al. (2006: 12-13) contend that the conflict events that have taken place in 
the country are mainly due to the weakness of the state, military, financial, and logistic 
interventions from neighboring countries, ethnic political violence, regime survival, and contests 
for control over natural and mineral resources.
14
 They hold that the structural conditions for 
                                                 
12
 Prior to the establishment of the Transitional Government, Kabila was assassinated by his bodyguard.  His son, 
Joseph Kabila, subsequently took over political power.   
13
 As succinctly described by Autesserre (2010: 4), “throughout the transition, unremitting clashes between various 
armed groups and militias, frequent massacres of civilians, massive population displacements, and appalling human 
rights violations, including widespread sexual violence, persisted in the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, North 
Katanga, and in Oriental Province’s Ituri district.” 
14
 The civil wars in the DRC involved up to fourteen foreign armies at different time periods (Autesserre, 2010: 2).   
14 
 
conflict are ultimately rooted in the weak political and legal institutions first established under 
Belgian colonial rule. Along with seeking to maintain political power through ‘divide-and-rule’ 
strategies, “the DRC state and individual officials also sought to systematically extract revenue 
for private and institutional purposes” and “it is under these conditions that ethnic and regional 
grievances and conflicts over access to natural resources have long flourished” (Nest et al., 2006: 
13).  
Yet the conflict events may also be rooted in local political agendas and incentives. 
Autesserre (2010) argues that these factors have influenced the conflict dynamics of the civil 
wars and the current civil unrest in the eastern provinces of the country. As Autesserre (2010: 8) 
notes that, “these [local] agendas pitted villagers, traditional chiefs, community chiefs, or ethnic 
leaders against one another over the distribution of land, the exploitation of local mining sites, 
the appointment to local administrative and traditional positions of authority, the collection of 
local taxes, and the relative social status of specific groups and individuals.”  Garrett and Seay 
(2011: 85) argue that “the primary basis of conflict in the Kivu provinces is longstanding tension 
over ethnicity, citizenship rights and land rights, which are in turn related to grievances over 
access to resources such as land, and over legitimacy and power. Conflict dynamics also include 
the marginalization of eastern DRC borderland areas from the capital Kinshasa, which are 
themselves symptomatic of broader governance failures in the DRC.”  
It is crucial to understand which factors matter most for the continuation of conflict in the 
eastern provinces, particularly considering that contemporary policy measures (e.g., Section 
1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act) are formulated on 
the basis of this understanding. In what follows, I put forth an instrumental variable regression 
approach to endogenize the locations of violent political activity across the country and then, in 
15 
 
turn, examine how conflict and local insecurity have influenced household-level durable 
ownership and living conditions.
15
   
 
2.3   Data 
 
To examine the microeconomic consequences of conflict, I combine disaggregated and geo-
referenced conflict event data from the Armed Conflict and Location Event Dataset (ACLED) 
with household-level data on durable ownership and living conditions from the 2007 cross 
sectional Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) for the DRC.   
The Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW) at the Peace Research Institute Oslo 
(PRIO) has developed the Armed Conflict and Location Event Dataset (ACLED), which 
provides information on each specific conflict event for the DRC. The DRC ACLED data 
contain exact dates, locations (at the latitude and longitude coordinate), and additional 
characteristics of conflict events during the first and second civil wars (data from 1997 to 2004) 
as well as the current conflict events that have taken place largely in the eastern provinces of the 
DRC (from 2004 until 2007 for the analysis here). These events were recorded on the basis of 
reports from war zones, humanitarian agencies, and other research publications. Figure  2.1 
presents a graphical depiction of the geographic distribution and intensity of conflict events 
across the DRC. 
 
  
                                                 
15
 The relationship may be most evident in the eastern provinces of the Kivus and Oriental Province, where “more 
than 80% of the inhabitants of these places consider their living conditions to be the same as or worse than during 
the wars” (Autesserre, 2010:  4).   
16 
 
Figure  2.1:  Distribution (By Quintile) of Conflict Events (ACLED Data) 
 
The Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) program (also known as MEASURE DHS) 
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individual- and household-level data on a range of socio-economic and health conditions for a 
number of countries across the developing world. Surveys are implemented in each country by 
ICF Macro in collaboration with the relevant administrative organizations in participating 
countries.
16
 Because the DHS surveys are primarily designed with the goal of collecting 
information on marriage, fertility, family planning, reproductive health, child health, and 
HIV/AIDS, women of reproductive age (15-49) are the primary focus of the DHS surveys. Yet 
the primary survey data are recoded in a number of formats, including household-level and 
individual-level recode files.  
In the DRC, surveys were administered at 300 cluster locations across the country. Each 
cluster location has a unique latitude and longitude coordinate assigned to it. In order to ensure 
the confidentiality of survey respondents, MEASURE DHS randomly displaces the GPS 
latitude/longitude coordinate positions for all of their surveys. Specifically, for each urban 
cluster, they ensure a minimum of 0 and maximum of 2 kilometers of positional error. For each 
rural cluster, there is a minimum of 0 and maximum of 5 kilometers of positional error. Some of 
the rural clusters that are easily identifiable (about 1% of the total) are displaced up to 10 
kilometers. To develop household-level economic data for use in this paper, I employ the 
household-level recode file for the DRC and combine it with latitude and longitude coordinates 
for each DHS cluster.
 17
 The data are representative at the national level, for residents in both 
                                                 
16
 USAID provides financial support for many of the surveys, though other countries receive funding from donors 
like UNICEF, UNFPA, and the World Bank (Rutstein and Royas, 2006). 
17
 In order to isolate the impact of conflict on household-level wealth, I only use the data points that have latitude 
and longitude coordinates, which include 2,990 of 2,999 conflict events and 8,679 out of 8,886 household-level 
observations. There are 3,959 conflict events in total in the ACLED file for the DRC, yet I only consider those 
conflict events that took place prior to 2007 in order to match these data with the household-level economic 
information. I confirmed with ICF Macro that the DHS clusters for the 2007 DRC survey that were missing geo-
markers were not missing this information because of security concerns in these areas. The latitude and longitude 
coordinates for these 7 clusters (out of 300) were not able to be verified due to errors from the GPS receivers (e.g., 
satellite acquisition errors). The omission of these specific clusters will not introduce any bias into the results. The 
18 
 
rural and urban areas, and in all eleven provinces of the country (Kinshasa, Bas-Congo, 
Bandundu, Équateur, Orientale, Nord-Kivu, Sud-Kivu, Maniema, Katanga, Kasaï Oriental, and 
Kasaï Occidental). 
‘Conflict exposure’ is the key explanatory variable of interest in this paper. I construct 
various measures of ‘conflict exposure’ based on the number of conflict events occurring within 
set distances (200 km, 100 km, and 50 km) of DHS cluster locations. These distances are chosen 
not only because of the sheer size of the country (see summary statistics in Table  2.1 and 
Table  2.4) but also because the latitude and longitude coordinates are not at the individual 
household level but at the DHS cluster locations.
18
 Further, because of the random displacement 
of GPS latitude and longitude coordinate positions in the DHS GPS file, it is necessary to use a 
broad radius around DHS cluster locations to capture the degree to which these cluster locations 
were exposed to violent political activity. These measures of conflict exposure should 
sufficiently capture the effects of local and regional violent political activity, local insecurity, 




                                                                                                                                                             
individual recode file used in this analysis as well as the GPS data are available (with prior approval) at the DHS 
site, http://www.measuredhs.com.    
18
 To calculate measures of conflict exposure, I first convert the latitude and longitude coordinates of both the DHS 
micro-level wealth data and the ACLED disaggregated conflict data from degrees to radians. This entails 
multiplying each latitude and longitude coordinate by 
  
   
. I then take the differences between latitude and longitude 
coordinates for the DHS and ACLED data and calculate the Haversine formula for the central angle for a distance 
measure:       (




    (        )     (      )     (




 .  I then calculate 
       (    ( )     (   )) and then multiply this figure by the earth’s radius in kilometers (6371 km) to 
derive the final distance measure. To ensure that this method is accurately capturing cluster-level conflict exposure, 
I have also calculated measures of conflict exposure using the ArcGIS buffer command, where I created 200km, 
100km, and 50km buffers around the DHS cluster locations and counted the number of conflict events that took 
place within each buffer zone.  
19 
 
Table  2.1:  Summary Statistics 
 
      
 # Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Wealth Index 8435 5.021814 2.93794 0 16 
Television 8435 .1481921 .3553113 0 1 
Refrigerator 8435 .0456432 .2087224 0 1 
Motor Transport 8435 .0284529 .1662726 0 1 
Telephone 8435 .0054535 .0736503 0 1 
Electricity 8435 .165738 .3718673 0 1 
Radio 8435 .4519265 .4977131 0 1 
Bicycle 8435 .2162418 .4117055 0 1 
Cement Floor 8435 .2061648 .4045742 0 1 
Improved Water Source 8435 .4704209 .4991539 0 1 
Mobile Phone 8435 .2256076 .4180066 0 1 
Grill/Heater 8435 .0994665 .2993051 0 1 
Chairs 8435 .7346769 .4415313 0 1 
Beds 8435 .7882632 .4085635 0 1 
Lamps 8435 .6628334 .4727703 0 1 
Stove/Cooker 8435 .0266746 .1611401 0 1 
Hoes 8435 .6701838 .4701741 0 1 
Improved Toilet 8435 .0758743 .2648126 0 1 
Number in Household 8435 5.433432 3.011624 1 28 
Capital or Large City 8435 .25738 .4372164 0 1 
Small City 8435 .0235922 .1517838 0 1 
Town 8435 .1353883 .3421581 0 1 
Altitude 8435 6.420025 .7063543 3.044523 8.188967 
Education (in years) of HHH 8435 6.704327 4.766502 0 18 
Percent of HH with Under 5 8435 .1881321 .178953 0 .8 
Male HHH 8435 .7892116 .4078926 0 1 
Age of HHH 8435 42.98791 14.35795 13 95 
Conflict Exposure – 200 km 8435 229.5911 279.8332 8 973 
Conflict Exposure – 100 km 8435 98.68085 131.8801 0 532 
Conflict Exposure – 50 km 8435 51.0735 76.17543 0 383 
Distance from Goma 8435 906.0282 529.551 1.32598 1881.164 
 
Because reliable micro-level measures of income or consumption expenditures are not 
available for the DRC, I use the DHS micro-data to create a simple wealth index that is the sum 
of a variety of binary indicator variables which are each given equal weight. These indicators 
include information about whether the household has the following: 
 Television ownership 
 Refrigerator ownership 
 Motor transport ownership (i.e., either a car, truck, motorcycle, or scooter) 
 Telephone ownership 
 Household electricity 
 Radio ownership 
 Bicycle ownership 
20 
 
 Cement floor in the household 
 Improved water source in the household 
 Mobile phone ownership 
 Ownership of a grill or heater 
 Ownership of chairs 
 Ownership of beds 
 Ownership of lamps 
 Ownership of a stove or cooker 
 Ownership of hoes 
 Access to a flush toilet or ventilated improved pit latrine 
An improved water source is defined here as water that is piped into a dwelling, yard, or plot, 
water that is accessible through a public tap or standpipe, water that is from a tube well, water 
that is from a protected well in a dwelling, yard, or plot, water that is from a protected public 
well, water that is from a protected spring, or the use of bottled water. All other sources of water 
are coded as a ‘0’ (e.g. unprotected spring water, river water, etc.).
19
  
While this wealth index is by no means a perfect indicator of economic development, it 
does allow for a relatively more tractable interpretation of how conflict exposure influences 
household-level durable ownership and living conditions than using the DHS wealth index 
(which is created via principal components analysis). Figure  2.2 presents a graphical depiction of 
the distribution of household-level ‘wealth’ across the DRC. In Section 6, I use the DHS wealth 







                                                 
19
 While some argue that a principal components analysis (PCA) approach is the best method for determining 
weights for the components of the wealth index (e.g. Filmer and Pritchett, 2001), it is difficult to interpret changes in 
the PCA wealth index relative to the wealth index constructed here. In the robustness checks below, I use the 
original DHS wealth index to ensure that the results are not driven by the way my wealth index was created or 
weighted. 
20
 The correlation between my wealth index and the original DHS wealth index is 0.8577. 
21 
 
Figure  2.2:  Distribution (By Quintile) of Cluster-level Average Household-
level Wealth (Constructed from DHS Data) 
  
I include a number of control variables in the regressions below, including age of the 
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small city, or a town, and the altitude of DHS cluster locations. To be sure, some of these control 
variables may be partially related to conflict exposure. Finding entirely exogenous control 
variables in this context is a challenging task. Many of the standard control variables used in 
development studies (e.g., human capital accumulation) will be at least partially endogenous to 
conflict exposure (see, for instance, Akresh and de Walque, 2008; Chamarbagwala and Moran, 
2011).  
In some of the regressions below, I include the education of the household head (in years) 
in order to assess whether controlling for this variable influences the results. Arguably, education 
(in years) is a good proxy for the historical distribution of expenditures on public goods and 
public services (like education) by the state and non-state actors (e.g., churches or NGOs). This 
variable may therefore capture some of the regional factors that influence household-level 
durable ownership and living conditions, therefore decreasing the likelihood of biasing the 
instrumental variable estimates.  
 
2.4   Identification Strategy  
 
Because of the potential for selection bias, estimates from ordinary least squares regressions will 
likely be biased and inconsistent. To illustrate why this may be the case, consider that rebel 
groups, local militias, and Congolese troops seek political control over different areas. Rebel 
groups would prospectively be attracted to (a) centers of political power (e.g. provincial/national 
capitals), (b) natural, mineral, and land resources, or (c) areas where the durables of the local 
populations easily appropriated. Provincial capitals have larger markets, public goods and 
services (e.g. schools, hospitals, sanitation, piped water, etc.) and therefore likely improved 
measures of durable ownership and living conditions. At the household level as well, relatively 
23 
 
wealthier households will attract attacks from rebel groups for the purposes of durable 
appropriation.
21
 Expropriation appears to be almost systematic, with “nearly all soldiers thus 
extort[ing] the local residents, stealing all kinds of valuables, such as money or mobile phones in 
urban areas and harvests or cattle in rural areas. Along with stealing, they often beat, jailed, 
raped, tortured, or killed those who refused to comply” (Autesserre, 2010: 56).  In this sense, 
there will be a significant degree of reverse causation and a non-random assignment of conflict 
events when assessing the relationship between wealth and conflict exposure.  
  I report the estimates from baseline OLS regressions in Table  2.2. The estimates suggest 
that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between wealth and conflict 
exposure. Yet, as suggested above, the OLS estimates are likely biased and inconsistent. This is 
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 As described by Autesserre (2010: 55), “each armed group used violence to deter villagers from supporting some 
other faction, or to punish them for having done so…all soldiers, in all components, preyed on local villages to make 
up for receiving little or no income.” 
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Table  2.2:  Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results 


















































       



































































































       













































       


















       


















Distance Radius 200 km 100 km 50 km 200 km 100 km 50 km 
Households 8435 8435 8435 8435 8435 8435 
Clustered standard errors (clustered at the DHS cluster location) in parentheses.  Statistical significance is indicated as follows:   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  The dependent variable is individual-level wealth.  Specifications (1) and (3) use a measure 
of conflict exposure that counts all conflict events that have taken place within a 200 km radius. Specifications (2) and (4) are for 
100 km radii and Specifications (3) and (6) 50 km radii, respectively. A constant term is included in each specification but is not 
reported. 
 
Because conflict events were not randomly assigned across the country, I use the 
variation in distances between DHS cluster locations and Goma, a city along the DRC-Rwanda 
border, as an instrument for conflict exposure. The provinces near Goma have experienced a 
disproportionate amount of conflict events and this instrumental variables strategy is intended to 
account for the distribution of conflict events across the country.
22
 One could interpret this 
                                                 
22
 The use of a distance-based instrument has precedent in the empirical literature on conflict and development. 
Akresh and de Walque (2010) exploit the variation in distances between Ugandan provincial capitals and the 
Uganda-Rwanda border as an instrument for war intensity in the context of the Rwandan genocide. I employ a 
25 
 
clustering of conflict events along the DRC-Rwanda border as being a result of the ‘spillover’ of 
the Rwandan genocide in addition to localized disputes. Another plausible interpretation is that 
this relates to being far in distance from the capital, Kinshasa, though so too are many other 
regions of the country (e.g., Lubumbashi). More credible is the idea that the Congolese 
government does not exercise much control over the eastern and northeastern provinces of the 
country as a result of state weakness and the strength of rebel groups maintaining territorial 
control in these provinces.  
A good instrumental variable is exogenous, is highly correlated with the endogenous 
variable of interest, and is uncorrelated with other unobservable influences of the dependent 
variable. With high distance radii (200 km), the correlation between conflict exposure and the 
distance instrument is high (-0.6424 for the correlation between distances from Goma and 
conflict exposure; -0.6830 when only those recent conflict events in the eastern provinces are 
considered), though for low distance radii (e.g. 50 km), the correlation is not as strong (-0.1721), 
mainly because the conflict events taking place near Kinshasa are, in effect, weighted more 
heavily (see the scatterplots in Figure  2.3 for a graphical depiction).  
  
                                                                                                                                                             
similar strategy, endogenously determining the intensity of conflict exposure across the country on the basis of 
distances between DHS cluster locations and Goma. 
26 
 
Figure  2.3:  Scatterplots of Conflict Exposure (ACLED) and Distance from 
Goma 
 
               Conflict exposure within 200 km        Conflict Exposure within 100 km 
 
Conflict Exposure within 50 km 
  























































































































































There are plausible scenarios in which the exclusion restriction may not be met (e.g. 
differential provision of public goods across geographic areas), though this is difficult to assess 
in practice. The identification strategy employed in this paper implicitly assumes that the 
distance measures only influence household-level wealth through their effects on conflict 
exposure, conditional on the set of included covariates (e.g. rural/urban differences, age, etc.). 
One way I control for the historical distribution of expenditures on public goods (e.g. public 
spending on education) is to include education (in years) as an explanatory variable. As stated 
above, I do not interpret the coefficient estimate on this variable as representing something 
causal—it is merely a control variable. But this control variable should help to capture the effects 
of the distance from the border or other previous policy factors so that the interpretation of the 
coefficient on conflict exposure can be seen as representing something causal. Because the 
equation below is exactly identified, I do not conduct a Sargan-Hansen test. I report the first 
stage results for the Angrist-Pischke multivariate F test of excluded instruments in the results 
tables below.  
 For the baseline IV specification, I model differences in micro-level wealth across the 
country as a function of conflict exposure, while instrumenting for conflict exposure using the 
distances between DHS clusters and Goma: 
(2.1)                   
               
(2.2)                 
                   
For the first stage regression,           is the conflict exposure of individual i.  Using IV/2SLS, 
this dependent variable is regressed on a vector of individual-level covariates (  ) and the 
distances between DHS clusters and Goma (     ), in addition to the individual-level error term, 
28 
 
   .
23
 For the second-stage regression,         is regressed on individual level covariates (  ) 
and the measure of exposure, (         ) as well as the individual-level error term,    . IV 
regressions are conducted using the ‘ivreg2’ package in Stata (Baum et al., 2010).  
There are likely to be unobservable factors that influence micro-level measures of durable 
ownership and living conditions that are systematically correlated over space. I therefore 
estimate the IV regression models using cluster-robust variance estimates.
24
 This strategy results 
in smaller, more conservative t-statistics, but the standard errors are more robust to potential 
heteroskedasticity and intra-cluster correlation.  
2.4.1   Potential Limitations 
 
It is plausible that the impact of violent conflict on economic development may be 
underestimated. While the DHS is a nationally representative survey, the conflicts in the DRC—
particularly the second civil war—led to targeted attacks on the civilian population, significant 
loss of life, and widespread internal displacement. Those who have been most exposed to 
conflict events over time (i.e. those killed directly or indirectly by conflict, those whose homes 
were completely looted or destroyed, etc.) will not be represented in the DHS sample, 
particularly considering that the civil wars resulted in the internal displacement of nearly 2 
million Congolese citizens (Autesserre, 2010: 5). There may be mortality-related selection bias 
and this would lead to bias in the estimated coefficient for ‘conflict exposure.’ It is also 
important to bear in mind that the conflict events in the DRC may have increased investment risk 
or the capacity of the state at the country level such that the effects of conflict exposure may not 
appear to have any effect on micro-level wealth.   
                                                 
23
 All first stage results are available from the author upon request.  
24
 The formula for the cluster-robust error variance-covariance estimator can be found in Baum (2006: 139). 
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 One potential limitation of using conflict exposure as a measure of the damage caused by 
conflict events in the DRC is that the history of conflict events in particular areas is only a proxy 
for the magnitude of damage to physical capital, infrastructure, and individual dwellings in 
particular regions. A single conflict event may actually have as similar an impact as two conflict 
events (in terms of deaths, damage to capital or infrastructure, etc.), for instance, but they are 
assigned different values in the conflict exposure data. Also, one single conflict event in an area 
may have led to the death of a family member, displacement and public health issues in a small 
community, or severe psychological trauma, which are incidents that may seriously hamper 
durable ownership and living conditions. This may prove to be a source of measurement error in 
the instrumental variables regressions. Nevertheless, the ACLED data can serve as a good proxy 
for the overall level of violent political activity, local insecurity, weak rule of law, and other 
political economy factors that systematically affect economic development.  
Since economies can bounce back in the wake of conflict (Davis and Weinstein, 2002; 
Brakman et al., 2004; Miguel and Roland, 2011), finding evidence of no effect of conflict on 
development is not implausible. As noted by Autesserre (2010: 4), after the two civil wars, 
political transition, and international diplomatic and humanitarian interventions, many families 
returned home, rebuilt their homes, and engaged in local markets. However, conflict events were 
still taking place in the eastern and northeastern provinces at the time of writing, which suggests 
that there will likely be evidence of a negative effect when conflict events in the eastern 
provinces are considered separately (below).  
With the available data, I cannot be certain whether household-level economic outcomes 
are not caused by conflict exposure in another region or even another country. High degrees of 
conflict exposure elsewhere may have led to relocations to areas in the DRC that are relatively 
30 
 
safer, a factor that would be associated with less precision in estimating the effects of conflict 
exposure on economic outcomes. Yet, if anything, this would produce a positive bias if the 
relationship between conflict exposure and economic outcomes were negative, as these 
individuals would likely self-select into areas that were relatively more secure. Transient citizens 
or visitors will have been exposed to less conflict exposure when surveyed, but will also have 
worse economic outcomes due to relocation. For these individuals, this would imply that the 
relationship between durable ownership and living standards is not as negatively related to my 
measure of conflict exposure, putting upward bias on the estimates.  
 
2.5   Results 
 
The results from the baseline instrumental variable regressions are presented in Table  2.3. In the 
first column, a measure of conflict exposure that accounts for conflict events that have taken 
place within a 200 km distance radius of DHS cluster locations is used as the key explanatory 
variable of interest. The estimates suggest that the mean cluster-level exposure to conflict events 
within 200 km (about 231 conflict events) is associated with a 14.7 percent decrease in the 
wealth index.
25
 This negative coefficient estimate contrasts sharply with OLS estimates that do 
not account for the potential for reverse causation and a non-random assignment of conflict 
events. Similarly, the average cluster-level exposure to conflict events within 100 km (about 100 
conflict events) is associated with a 16.7 percent decrease in the wealth index. Lastly, for the 
mean cluster-level exposure to conflict events within 50 km (about 52 conflict events) is 
associated with a 27.9 percent decrease in the wealth index. For the first-stage regression results 
for the first specification (Column 1), the Angrist-Pischke multivariate F test of excluded 
                                                 
25
 The wealth index has a mean of 5.021816. 
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instruments is 97.77 and I can therefore reject the null hypothesis of weak identification given 
Stock-Yogo critical values (16.38 for 10% maximal IV size).  
 
Table  2.3:  Instrumental Variable Regression Results 


















































       










































































       












       

















































       


















       


















Distance Radius 200 km 100 km 50 km 200 km 100 km 50 km 
Households 8435 8435 8435 8435 8435 8435 
F test of excluded 
instruments 
97.77 72.23 21.89 96.02 71.32 22.08 
2
nd
 Stage F statistic 63.59 51.72 27.87 75.94 62.51 37.18 




























Clustered standard errors (clustered at the DHS cluster location) in parentheses.  Statistical significance is indicated as follows:  * 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  The dependent variable is individual-level wealth.  Specifications (1) and (3) use a measure of 
conflict exposure that counts all conflict events that have taken place within a 200 km radius. Specifications (2) and (4) are for 
100 km radii and Specifications (3) and (6) 50 km radii.. The 1st stage F-test statistic is the F-test of excluded instruments. The 2nd 
stage F-test statistic is the overall F-test for the 2nd stage. A constant term is included but not reported. 
 
As discussed above, the historical distribution of public spending on schools and 
hospitals across countries may be one of the factors that violate the exclusion restriction of the 
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IV approach. In other words, household-level wealth may be related to ‘distance from Goma’ in 
other ways than the impact of distance from the DRC-Rwanda border on conflict exposure. 
Including education (in years) may be one way to control for this confounding influence. When I 
control for education (in years), the magnitude of the coefficient on conflict exposure is 
somewhat less. Column 4 of Table  2.3 presents the baseline results where distance from Goma is 
used as an instrument for the number of conflict events within a 200 km distance. The coefficient 
estimate is -0.00248, which, at a mean level of cluster-level conflict exposure of about 231 
results in a reduction of the wealth index by 11.4 percent.  
 
2.6   Robustness Checks  
2.6.1   Cluster-level Control Variables 
 
One of the limitations of the results in Table  2.3 is that there are no cluster-level covariates in the 
regression models. In this section, I incorporate cluster-level control variables on the locations of 
mining sites, roads, and airports. By doing so, I am able to test the robustness of the baseline 
results by controlling for some of the geographical and economic environmental factors that may 
influence household-level economic conditions, conflict events, or both.  
 Data on the locations of mining concessions comes from the International Peace 
Information Service (IPIS) in Antwerp, Belgium. The IPIS has developed a series of maps on the 
mineral sector of the DRC. For this paper, I use data from their map on mine concessions across 
the country.
26
 The data are official and public data from the DRC’s Cadastre Minier (CaMi). I 
specifically focus on mining concessions where the companies involved have an exploitation 
permit, a tailings processing permit, a small-scale mining exploitation permit, or a permanent 
                                                 
26
 This map is available at http://www.ipisresearch.be/mine-concessions-drc.php 
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quarry exploitation authorization. These activities should sufficiently capture mining activity 
(rather than general exploration permits or applications for exploration and/or exploitation 
permits). In order to match the mining data with the household-level wealth and conflict data, I 
only use those mining sites for which the company or corporation had their concession granted to 
them by the government prior to 2007.
27
 I then calculate the total size of the shapefile areas for 
the mining sites within specified distances of DHS cluster locations. This calculation will capture 
the relative magnitude of mining activity within certain vicinities of the DHS clusters.  
 Information on the locations and lengths of primary and secondary roads comes from the 
roads shapefile from the African Development Bank Group.
28
 I calculate the total length of roads 
within specific distances of DHS cluster locations in order to control for road density and other 
geographic attributes of DHS cluster locations. Information about the location of paved, IATA-
coded airports across the country is drawn from Air Broker Center International AB.
29
 Lastly, I 
use shapefiles on administrative boundaries for the DRC from FAO’s Africover.
30
 Summary 







                                                 
27
 The data on granted mining concessions run from April 1994 to the end of 2006 (for this analysis).  
28
 The shapefile is available at http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/documents/type/arcgis-shape-files/congo-dr 
29
 I thank Tilman Brück at DIW Berlin for suggesting the use of airports as a control variable. The data on airports 
across the DRC are available at http://www.aircraft-charter-world.com/airports/africa/congodr.htm. I only geo-code 
airports that have paved runways and IATA codes. While it would be interesting to geo-code all of the airports that 
are listed on this site, I could only visually confirm the locations of all of the paved, IATA-coded airports through 
Google Earth. This provided a natural guideline for which airports to include in the analysis.   
30
 The shapefile for administrative boundaries for the DRC is available at http://www.africover.org/. 
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Table  2.4:  Summary Statistics -Variables Used in Section 2.6 
      
 # Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Original DHS Wealth Index 8435 3.189212 100165.6 -107521 345191 
Wealth Index - Liquid 8435 3.138115 1.655543 0 8 
Wealth Index - Illiquid 8435 1.883699 1.693944 0 9 
DHS Cluster Latitude 8435 -3.689572 3.48932 -11.7621 4.640158 
DHS Cluster Longitude 8435 22.56878 5.36442 12.61893 30.96663 
Airports (200 km) 8435 1.300771 .759256 0 3 
Airports (100 km) 8435 .6570243 .7433821 0 2 
Airports (50 km) 8435 .4713693 .6978944 0 2 
Mining Sites (200 km) 8435 .1803309 .234341 0 .9290972 
Mining Sites (100 km) 8435 .0602926 .1138374 0 .5072917 
Mining Sites (50 km) 8435 .0163952 .0365602 0 .2383333 
Total Road Length (200 km) 8435 2138.083 574.4519 786.4307 3586.059 
Total Road Length (100 km) 8435 763.8113 231.5467 0 1535.314 
Total Road Length (50 km) 8435 336.9962 156.438 0 734.8842 
Conflict – GED (200 km)  8435 77.65975 110.132 0 406 
Conflict – GED (100 km) 8435 33.98814 53.78902 0 208 
Conflict – GED (50 km) 8435 16.51879 24.80985 0 120 
Conflict – Wars/Civ (200 km) 8435 116.6333 129.0029 5 470 
Conflict – Wars/Civ (100 km) 8435 47.59312 63.11589 0 292 
Conflict – Wars/Civ (50 km) 8435 23.34215 39.01607 0 253 
Conflict – East/Civ (200 km) 8435 64.76574 121.7141 0 411 
Conflict – East/Civ (100 km) 8435 28.28477 60.14331 0 255 
Conflict – East/Civ (50 km) 8435 12.46663 26.89498 0 124 
Distance from Kinshasa 8435 911.8457 572.2951 .5452207 1903.349 
 
 Using these three cluster-level control variables, I find very similar results regarding the 
impact of conflict on household-level durable ownership and living conditions (Table  2.5). The 
coefficient estimates are only slightly smaller while they remain highly statistically significant. I 
find strong evidence that airports are positively associated with household-level durable 
ownership and living conditions, though the direction of causation in this situation is uncertain 
since the locations of airports may reflect population density and the clustering of wealth, rather 
than causing greater access to international markets or trade networks. Nevertheless, the 
locations of airports should serve as a decent proxy for historical pockets of wealth across the 
country, which may make inference of the impact of conflict on development more precise. 
Further, the locations of airports may also influence the location of conflict events, as discussed 
in Subsection 2.2. Indeed, there is a strong conditional correlation between the number of 
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airports that are within cluster radii and the number of conflict events to which a cluster has been 
exposed.  
2.6.2   Different Measure of Household-level Wealth 
 
Another potential critique of the results in Table  2.3 is that household-level wealth may be 
poorly measured by the simple index of durable ownership and living conditions. In this 
subsection, I therefore consider using the original DHS wealth index as the dependent variable. 
This strategy allows for the use of a more comprehensive measure of household-level wealth but 
has the disadvantage of making the coefficient interpretation somewhat more challenging. 
Figure  2.4 presents the distribution (by quintile) of household-level wealth, as measured by the 
original DHS wealth index. 
 Using the original DHS wealth index as the dependent variable, I find very similar results 
(Presented in Table  2.6). Conflict exposure has a negative and significant impact on household-
level wealth and the magnitude of this effect is comparable to the estimates in the earlier 
regression results. One of the initial reasons for using this index was its difficulty in interpreting 
the estimated coefficients of the explanatory and control variables. Nonetheless, the relative 
magnitudes, absolute magnitudes, and signs of the estimated coefficients—as well as their 
statistical significance—are remarkably similar to the prior results. These results also hold when 
using the latitude coordinate and longitude coordinate of DHS cluster locations as separate 




Table  2.5:  Instrumental Variable Regression Results -  
Inclusion of Cluster-level Control Variables 


















































       



































































































       

















































       











































       

































       


















Distance Radius 200 km 100 km 50 km 200 km 100 km 50 km 
Households 8435 8435 8435 8435 8435 8435 
F test of excluded 
instruments 
94.07 87.51 38.68 93.05 85.39 37.35 
2nd Stage F statistic 60.11 55.31 52.63 75.01 68.43 68.60 


























Clustered standard errors (clustered at the DHS cluster location) in parentheses.  Statistical significance is indicated as follows:  * 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  The dependent variable is individual-level wealth.  Specifications (1) and (3) use a measure of 
conflict exposure that counts all conflict events that have taken place within a 200 km radius. Specifications (2) and (4) are for 
100 km radii and Specifications (3) and (6) 50 km radii. The Hansen J over identification statistic reported above is the Chi-




Figure  2.4:  Distribution (By Quintile) of Cluster-level Average Household-











































































































































































































Original DHS Wealth Index
!( -93745.600000 - -63897.140000
!( -63897.139999 - -52728.370000
!( -52728.369999 - -33665.730000
!( -33665.729999 - 64993.600000
!( 64993.600001 - 270175.200000
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Table  2.6:  Instrumental Variable Regression Results - Using the Original 
DHS Wealth Index 


















































       












































































       












       

















































       













































       
























































Distance Radius 200 km 100 km 50 km 200 km 100 km 50 km 
Households 8435 8435 8435 8435 8435 8435 
F test of excluded 
instruments 
94.07 87.51 38.68 93.05 85.39 37.35 
2nd Stage F statistic 41.36 46.25 52.73 53.35 57.51 67.87 
Distance from 

























Clustered standard errors (clustered at the DHS cluster location) in parentheses.  Statistical significance is indicated as follows:   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  The dependent variable is the original DHS wealth index.  Specifications (1) and (3) use a 
measure of conflict exposure that counts all conflict events that have taken place within a 200 km radius. Specifications (2) and 




2.6.3   Different Instruments 
 
One of the potential limitations of using the distance from Goma as an instrumental variable for 
conflict exposure is that distance from Goma may influence household durable ownership and 
living conditions in other ways than its direct influence on conflict exposure. For instance, 
distance from Goma may capture the influence of Congolese-Rwandese trade routes or the 
historical provision of public goods. In this sense, the distance from Goma may very well 
influence household living standards in other ways. Because ‘distance from Goma’ is the only 
instrument used in the regressions above, I cannot report over identification statistics to test 
whether the null of instrument validity should be rejected. 
 In this section, I therefore explore using different instruments for conflict exposure. 
Instead of using distance from Goma as the sole instrument, I use the latitude coordinate and the 
longitude coordinate at which DHS clusters are located as instruments for cluster-region conflict 
exposure. These instruments are not as strongly associated with conflict exposure as the variable 
that captures the distances between DHS cluster locations and Goma, yet this strategy does have 
the advantage of allowing for the calculation of over identification statistics. Further, this 
approach accomplishes a similar task (albeit imperfectly) of accounting for the non-random 
assignment of conflict events across the country. An increase in either the latitude or longitude 
coordinate at which the DHS survey is located (from the average coordinates) are associated with 
an increase in conflict exposure. This is because, for a number of reasons discussed above, the 
conflict events have taken place at a much higher rate in the eastern provinces of the country. 





(2.3)                   
     
        
(2.4)                 
                   
In 1.3,    is the vector of the latitude and longitude coordinates for the DHS cluster locations and 
all the other variables are the same as in equations 2.1 and 2.2. One potential critique of the 
earlier instrumental variables approach could be that the instrument, distance from Goma, may 
influence the dependent variable, wealth, independent of its effects on the key explanatory 
variable, conflict exposure. While the validity of these instruments cannot be proven, I can now 
report the over identification tests (Hansen J statistic) from the instrumental variables regressions 
that use the DHS cluster location latitude and longitude coordinate to test whether the null of 
instrument validity should be rejected. 
 The estimates from the IV regressions using latitude and longitude coordinates of DHS 
cluster locations as separate instruments for conflict exposure are presented in Table  2.7. By and 
large, the coefficient estimates remain unchanged, although these aren’t as strong of instruments 
as ‘distance from Goma’ (in terms of the first stage F-test of instrument exclusion). I cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of instrument validity in any of the specifications and the p-value for 
the Hansen J over identification statistic is quite high. In Table  2.8, I report similar results from 
the instrumental variables regressions that use the DHS cluster latitude and longitude coordinates 




Table  2.7:  Instrumental Variable Regression Results with Latitude and 
Longitude Coordinates as Instruments 


















































       

































































































       















































       











































       

































       


















Distance Radius 200 km 100 km 50 km 200 km 100 km 50 km 
N 8435 8435 8435 8435 8435 8435 
Excluded instruments 36.05 33.63 13.14 35.47 32.44 12.61 





















































Hansen J – P-value 0.7934 0.8725 0.5032 0.9247 0.8597 0.5108 
Clustered standard errors (clustered at the DHS cluster location) in parentheses.  Statistical significance is indicated as follows:   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  The dependent variable is the original DHS wealth index.  Specifications (1) and (3) use a 
measure of conflict exposure that counts all conflict events that have taken place within a 200 km radius. Specifications (2) and 




Table  2.8:  Instrumental Variable Regression Results - New Instruments, DHS 
Wealth Index 


















































       










































































       












       

















































       























































































       


















Distance Radius 200 km 100 km 50 km 200 km 100 km 50 km 
Households 8435 8435 8435 8435 8435 8435 
Excluded instruments 36.05 33.63 13.14 35.47 32.44 12.61 
2nd Stage F statistic 39.39 44.40 51.24 49.47 54.87 64.53 
















































Hansen J – P-value 0.3960 0.1798 0.3440 0.2551 0.1431 0.2571 
Clustered standard errors (clustered at the DHS cluster location) in parentheses.  Statistical significance is indicated as follows:   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  The dependent variable is the original DHS wealth index.  Specifications (1) and (3) use a 
measure of conflict exposure that counts all conflict events that have taken place within a 200 km radius. Specifications (2) and 




2.6.4   Splitting the Wealth Index into Two Components 
 
It is also interesting to tease out what specific economic impacts the civil wars and conflict 
events have had. In Table  2.9 and Table  2.10, I split the wealth index into two different 
measures: one wealth index that measures relatively more “liquid” household durables or assets 
and another that measures more “illiquid” household durables or assets. Specifically, I define the 




 Mobile phone 




I define the ‘illiquid’ durables or measures of living conditions as an addition of the following 
indicators: 
 Electricity 
 Cement floor 
 Improved water source 
 Refrigerator 
 Telephone 





By and large, I find similar results when splitting the wealth index into its ‘liquid’ and ‘illiquid’ 
components (see Table  2.9 and Table  2.10). This suggests that both household-level durable 





Table  2.9:  Instrumental Variable Regression Results - Wealth Index using 
"Liquid" Components Only 


















































       



































































































       

















































       











































       









































       


















Distance Radius 200 km 100 km 50 km 200 km 100 km 50 km 
Households 8435 8435 8435 8435 8435 8435 
Excluded instruments 36.05 33.63 13.14 35.47 32.44 12.61 
2nd Stage F statistic 73.05 69.74 61.75 91.95 87.93 78.86 















































Hansen J – P-value 0.5657 0.4726 0.2458 0.6669 0.4232 0.2271 
Clustered standard errors (clustered at the DHS cluster location) in parentheses.  Statistical significance is indicated as follows:   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  The dependent variable is the original DHS wealth index.  Specifications (1) and (3) use a 
measure of conflict exposure that counts all conflict events that have taken place within a 200 km radius. Specifications (2) and 




Table  2.10:  Instrumental Variable Regression Results - Wealth Index using 
"Illiquid" Components Only 


















































       










































































       












       

















































       













































       





































       


















Distance Radius 200 km 100 km 50 km 200 km 100 km 50 km 
Households 8435 8435 8435 8435 8435 8435 
Excluded instruments 36.05 33.63 13.14 35.47 32.44 12.61 
2nd Stage F statistic 28.52 30.23 33.82 31.69 33.57 38.16 















































Hansen J – P-value 0.9491 0.7227 0.9375 0.8307 0.7044 0.9869 
Clustered standard errors (clustered at the DHS cluster location) in parentheses.  Statistical significance is indicated as follows:   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  The dependent variable is the original DHS wealth index.  Specifications (1) and (3) use a 
measure of conflict exposure that counts all conflict events that have taken place within a 200 km radius. Specifications (2) and 




2.6.5   New Data on Conflict Events 
 
The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) recently released the Georeferenced Events Dataset 
(GED) (Sundberg, Lindgren, and Padskocimaite, 2010; Melander and Sundberg, 2011). Much 
like the ACLED, the GED provides georeferenced, disaggregated information on conflict events. 
The scatterplots of conflict exposure and distance from Goma, using the UCDP-GED data, are 
presented in Figure  2.5 and the geographic distribution and intensity of conflict events, as 
measured by the UCDP-GED, are presented in Figure  2.6. Unlike the ACLED, however, the 
GED covers a time period from 1989 onwards and has different guidelines for how conflict 
events are defined and recorded. Because the ACLED may have been developed with some 
degree of measurement error (Eck, 2012), it is important to assess whether this influences the 
core results in this paper. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to compare and contrast the 
GED and ACLED, interested readers can find an article-length comparison of the two datasets in 
Eck (2012).  
For the purposes of this paper, I will use the GED to demonstrate that regardless of how 
conflict events across the DRC are defined and coded, I find similar results regarding the impact 
of conflict and local insecurity on household-level economic conditions across the country. 
Again, I use the ACLED and GED conflict events datasets mainly as proxies for local and 
regional conflict exposure, so the individual events and how they are coded and defined are of 
less concern than the local and regional aggregated conflict exposure measures.  
I created 200 km, 100 km, and 50 km buffers around DHS cluster locations and then 
considered how many conflict events were contained within each buffer zone. Remarkably, in 
doing so I find correlations of the ACLED and GED conflict exposure measures of 0.9761 for a 
200 km radius, 0.9405 for a 100 km radius, and 0.9245 for a 50 km radius. These correlations 
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suggest that both measures of conflict exposure are essentially capturing the same effects and 
both therefore measures serve as reasonable proxies for local conflict exposure and local 
insecurity. This is surprising considering that the two datasets have different temporal 
dimensions—the GED has a longer time frame than the ACLED—and there are more events 
coded in the ACLED than in the GED. Results are presented in Table  2.11, showing very similar 
relative magnitudes of the impact of conflict and local insecurity on household-level durable 
ownership and living conditions. 
Figure  2.5:  Scatterplots of Conflict Exposure (UCDP-GED) and Distance 
from Goma 
  
               Conflict exposure within 200 km        Conflict Exposure within 100 km 
 
 







































































































































































































_̂ 1 - 2
_̂ 3 - 6
_̂ 7 - 13
_̂ 14 - 23
_̂ 24 - 37
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Table  2.11:  Instrumental Variable Regression Results - UCDP-GED Data 


















































       



































































































       















































       















































































       


















Distance Radius 200 km 100 km 50 km 200 km 100 km 50 km 
Households 8435 8435 8435 8435 8435 8435 
Excluded instruments 48.12 38.04 19.32 46.87 36.23 18.48 
2nd Stage F statistic 62.00 64.98 63.79 74.69 79.38 80.44 











































Hansen J – P-value 0.8078 0.9172 0.5953 0.9388 0.9726 0.5885 
Clustered standard errors (clustered at the DHS cluster location) in parentheses.  Statistical significance is indicated as follows:   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  The dependent variable is the original DHS wealth index.  Specifications (1) and (3) use a 
measure of conflict exposure that counts all conflict events that have taken place within a 200 km radius. Specifications (2) and 





2.6.6   Different Measure of Conflict Exposure  
 
In addition to differentiating measures of conflict exposure on the basis of three different 
distances (200 km, 100 km, and 50 km), in this section I split measures of conflict exposure 
along temporal dimensions. Since there are distinct periods of conflict in the DRC (the first and 
second civil wars and current conflict events in the eastern provinces), I explore how different 
conflict periods matter for durable ownership and living conditions.  Defined here, the split 
between the two conflicts takes place on January 1, 2004, with all conflict events in the DRC 
taking place on or after this day referred to as conflict events during the ‘Kivu crisis’ and all 
events taking place before this day referred to as the first and second civil war period. In 
structuring the specifications in such a way, I can better understand the different effects of 
conflict exposure at different times of the conflict.   
 Another way I check the robustness of the baseline results is to differentiate conflict 
exposure on the basis of different conflict events. The ACLED project categorizes each conflict 
event as being (1) a battle in which the government regains territory, (2) a battle in which there is 
no change of territory, (3) a battle in which rebels overtake territory, (4) the establishment of a 
rebel headquarters or base, (5) non-violent activity by a conflict actor, (6) a non-violent transfer 
of territory, (7) riots or protests, and (8) violence against civilians. I explore whether 
differentiating these conflict events on the basis of civilian impact has an influence on the results.  
To do so, I create a measure of civilian impact, where the variable is coded as a ‘1’ if the conflict 
events pertain to situations 1, 2, 3, 4, or 8.  The other events receive a ‘0’. This will test the 
robustness of the results by excluding conflict events that likely have less of an impact on the 
civilian population.   
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 The results of the robustness checks are presented in Table  2.12 and Table  2.13. 
Table  2.12 presents the results from constraining conflict exposure to those events taking place 
during the first and second civil wars that have had a civilian impact. The conflict exposure 
coefficients are negative, fairly large in magnitude, and vary in statistical significance. In two of 
the specifications, the correlations between conflict exposure and the latitude and longitude 
coordinate instruments are relatively low (though still highly statistically significant), which 
implies these may not be the strongest of instruments (i.e., the F test statistic is just less than 10). 
When I use the number of conflict events taking place after the beginning of 2004 for my 
measure of conflict exposure (with various distance radii), the coefficient estimates for conflict 
exposure are negative, large, and still vary in statistical significance on the basis of how conflict 
exposure is constructed. These results are also largely robust to differentiating the sample of 




Table  2.12:  Instrumental Variable Regression Results - ACLED Restricted 
(1) 


















































       































































































       

















































       











































       





































       


















Distance Radius 200 km 100 km 50 km 200 km 100 km 50 km 
N 8435 8435 8435 8435 8435 8435 
Excluded instruments 40.76 26.60 9.68 40.42 25.96 9.52 
2nd Stage F statistic 61.77 54.02 58.40 76.17 71.02 76.43 













































Hansen J – P-value 0.8541 0.8960 0.7726 0.9809 0.8784 0.7335 
Clustered standard errors (clustered at the DHS cluster location) in parentheses.  Statistical significance is indicated as follows:   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  The dependent variable is the original DHS wealth index.  Specifications (1) and (3) use a 
measure of conflict exposure that counts all conflict events that have taken place within a 200 km radius. Specifications (2) and 




Table  2.13:  Instrumental Variable Regression Results - ACLED Restricted 
(2) 


















































       



































































































       















































       











































       
























































Distance Radius 200 km 100 km 50 km 200 km 100 km 50 km 
Households 8435 8435 8435 8435 8435 8435 
Excluded instruments 39.23 33.21 24.07 37.96 31.05 22.40 
2nd Stage F statistic 60.90 63.69 67.22 74.67 77.89 83.57 














































Hansen J – P-value 0.8849 0.9555 0.6011 0.9983 0.9981 0.5953 
Clustered standard errors (clustered at the DHS cluster location) in parentheses.  Statistical significance is indicated as follows:   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  The dependent variable is the original DHS wealth index.  Specifications (1) and (3) use a 
measure of conflict exposure that counts all conflict events that have taken place within a 200 km radius. Specifications (2) and 




2.6.7   Distance from Kinshasa 
 
One additional way to test the robustness of the results is to include distance from Kinshasa as a 
control variable. It is plausible that distance from Kinshasa could influence household-level 
economic conditions because (a) wealth is simply less further from the capital, perhaps because 
of the historical distribution of spending on public services or because of a withdrawal of support 
during the latter stages of the Mobutu regime or (b) the government does not exercise territorial 
control over the eastern and northeastern provinces of the country and, as such, the levels of 
conflict will be more. I include this variable in the regression analyses. These results are 
presented in Table  2.14. For some of the specifications, the coefficient estimate for conflict 
exposure is no longer statistically significant, though it remains so when using the distance 
measures of 100 km and 50 km.  I don’t find much evidence of a strong impact on household-
level wealth of being far or close to Kinshasa, perhaps because I control for a number of cluster-




Table  2.14:  Instrumental Variable Regression Results Using Distance from 
Kinshasa as a Covariate 














































       

































































































       

















































       











































       

































       














       


















Distance Radius 200 km 100 km 50 km 200 km 100 km 50 km 
N 8435 8435 8435 8435 8435 8435 
Excluded Instruments 41.47 21.05 17.10 41.65 21.25 17.42 
2nd Stage F statistic 64.15 52.59 55.55 76.07 61.93 68.05 
















































Hansen J – P-value 0.1165 0.9876 0.8239 0.2533 0.6129 0.5029 




2.7   Conclusion and Discussion 
 
Civil war is ‘development in reverse’ (Collier et al., 2003) and nowhere has this been more 
evident than in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  The evidence put forth in this paper 
suggests that the conflict events that have taken place across the DRC have had a significant 
negative impact on household-level durable ownership and living conditions.
31
  This finding is 
consistent with many of the qualitative reports on the topic and gives an empirical contribution to 
the literature. More broadly, the results illustrate how local political incentives and political 
agendas generate significant economic externalities for the population at large.   
 While the results are fairly intuitive, there are a number of limitations to this study that 
should be noted. First, the instrumental variable strategy employed in this paper makes the 
assumption that the instruments (the distances between DHS cluster locations and Goma, and the 
latitude and longitude coordinates of the DHS cluster locations) only influence household-level 
economic conditions through their impact on cluster-level conflict exposure. It is plausible, 
however, that other historical or economic factors can also affect economic conditions through 
this distance channel. Second, while the data used in this paper are novel for the DRC, they are 
still measured with an amount of imprecision that should be considered. Lastly, more research 
must be conducted on the role of the mineral sector in affecting the location of violence across 
the country. The findings regarding the role of the mineral sector in influencing both conflict 
events and household-level economic conditions should be viewed as suggestive rather than 
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 This finding highlights the economic consequence of civil war in the DRC, yet this is only one of the 
consequences. As described by Autesserre (2010: 2), as a result of civil war, “an estimated one thousand civilians 
die every day, mostly due to malnutrition and diseases that could be easily prevented if the Congo’s already weak 
economic and social structures had not collapsed during the conflict…81% [of those living in the eastern provinces] 
had to flee their homes, more than half experienced the violent death of family members or friends, more than a 
third were abducted for at least a week, and 16% were subject to sexual violence, usually repeatedly.”    
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definitive. Ultimately, until more data are available for the DRC, there are still a number of 
things we simply do not know about the causes and consequences of conflict across the country.  
 Generally, the results of this paper suggest there are two important areas of research that 
must be better developed.  First, while differences in meta-level institutional and political factors 
partly explain cross-country variation in economic performance (see, e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, 
and Robinson, 2001), local political economy factors (e.g. the decisions and appropriative 
actions of rebel groups, government troops, etc.) also have strong implications for local 
economic development.  Development economists must turn their attention towards 
understanding the local political processes by which economic outcomes are influenced.
32
  
Second, more research is needed on the topics of conflict resolution, state building, and post-
conflict economic reconstruction, especially in the DRC. To date, only a handful of studies have 
addressed the political economy of these processes. Coyne (2008) analyzes the political economy 
of state-building efforts, highlighting how issues of local incentives and local knowledge will 
prevent most externally-planned state-building efforts from being successful.  Autesserre (2010) 
assesses why international peace-building efforts in the DRC have largely been ineffective, 
pointing to a systematic lack of attention to local political economy issues.  In essence, there are 
a number of constraints on what those involved in peace-building efforts can accomplish.  
Finding alternative mechanisms for conflict resolution is therefore crucial.    
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 To be sure, local political economy factors are likely to be related to national-level political institutions or regional 
protection and enforcement of property rights.  
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Chapter 3  
 
Infant Mortality over the Electoral Cycle 
 
 
3.1   Introduction 
 
Economists have long studied whether incumbent politicians ‘electioneer’ fiscal and monetary 
policy in order to improve their re-election prospects. Models by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and 
Rogoff (1990) suggest that incumbent politicians will pursue policies that keep them in power 
and that these policies will often take the form of targeted transfer payments and highly visible 
government expenditures. As a real world example of this sort of electioneering, consider that in 
2009 the opposition to the Ahmadinejad government in Iran argued that the government 
distributed 400,000 tons of potatoes around the country and gave bonuses (along with gold 
coins) to government workers in the run up to the presidential election (Fathi, 2009).  
To date, the empirical literature on ‘election-year economics’ (Brender and Drazen, 
2007) has mainly focused on whether there are electoral cycles in macro-level variables like 
employment, GDP, the money supply, tax rates, expenditures, and budget deficits. Evidence of 
opportunistic political business cycles is mixed (see recent studies by Grier and Grier, 2000; 
Drazen, 2001; Franzese, 2002; Brender and Drazen, 2007; Grier, 2008). There is much stronger 
empirical support for political budget cycles than political business cycles, though evidence 
seems to be limited to developing countries (Shi and Svensson, 2006), relatively young 





 Nevertheless, there has been recent evidence of electoral cyclicality in the 
OECD in public health expenditures (Potrafke, 2010). 
 This paper takes a different route than the existing literature by testing whether infant 
mortality rates fluctuate over the electoral cycle. Recent studies have shown that infant mortality 
rates across the developing world are highly sensitive to short-run fluctuations in aggregate 
income (Baird, Friedman, and Schady, 2011), weather patterns and disease ecology (Kudamatsu, 
Persson, and Stromberg, 2011), and commodity prices (Miller and Urdinola, 2010). In addition 
to these economic and environmental conditions, it is also important to assess whether there are 
important political economy explanations for fluctuations in infant mortality rates. Much of the 
literature on political budget cycles points to increases in transfer payments and deficit spending 
as the channels through which incumbent politicians seek to improve their chances of being re-
elected (Tufte, 1978; Rogoff, 1990; Schady, 2000), thus it is not unexpected to observe decreases 
in infant mortality prior to elections. To be certain, the impact of electoral cycles on infant 
mortality is not expected to be as large in magnitude as other economic shocks or humanitarian 
crises, yet there are reasons to believe the effects may be nontrivial.  
 Addressing whether there is electoral cyclicality in infant mortality is important for a 
number of reasons. First, Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney (2006) argue that diarrheal disease 
and respiratory infections—two of the main causes of infant and under-5 deaths in the 
developing world—are easily treated with oral rehydration therapy and antibiotics. The question 
remains why these treatments are not available to infants suffering from easily preventable 
illnesses, particularly among those countries that receive a large amount of health sector-specific 
aid. The answer likely rests with political economy explanations. To date, only a handful of 
studies have examined how specific political or institutional factors influence micro-level health 
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 See also Persson and Tabellini (2005). 
60 
 
outcomes across the developing world. Kudamatsu (2011), for instance, presents evidence that 
democratization in Africa led to declines in infant mortality rates. Yet it is also important to 
assess whether there are political economy explanations for fluctuations in infant mortality, 
hence this paper. Second, studies on electoral cyclicality in fiscal policies and macroeconomic 
outcomes employ overly aggregated data on expenditures, tax rates, and other outcome measures 
(if they are available). This paper uses a rich source of information on individual level outcomes 
across the developing world, which allows me to control for infant- and mother-specific 
conditions that may affect the probability of infant mortality. Lastly, this question is interesting 
from an empirical perspective because the effects of elections on infant mortality are somewhat 
ambiguous. While transfers and government spending often increase prior to elections, so too do 
political instability, violence, and repression of opposition groups in countries with relatively 
weak institutions.  
 In examining election-year effects on infant mortality rates, I find only limited evidence 
of any sort of electoral cyclicality. In matching election dates with infant birth dates to create 
different exposure windows, I find some evidence that in utero exposure to presidential elections 
is associated with a reduced probability of infant mortality ex post, yet this result seems to be 
driven by the impact of democracy rather than elections per se. The results suggest that the level 
of electoral competition would need to be relatively high to observe declines in infant mortality 
rates prior to elections.  
The paper proceeds as follows. I first discuss the potential transmission mechanisms by 
which electoral cycles may influence infant mortality rates in Section 2. Section 3 describes the 
data. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the main results and discusses 
how different political institutions matter for the impact of elections on infant mortality rates. 
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Section 6 examines differences in the timing of election dates and birth dates. Section 7 
concludes. 
 
3.2   The Logic of Electoral Cycles 
 
In this section, I first discuss why elections provide incentives for incumbent politicians to 
pursue expansionary policies or increases in transfer payments prior to elections and what the 
literature suggests about the relationship between these transfer payments and infant health 
outcomes. I then discuss some of the other channels through which elections may influence 
infant health outcomes, with specific attention to pre- and post-electoral violence and political 
repression. 
3.2.1   Electoral Incentives and Infant Mortality 
 
An extensive literature on ‘election economics’ suggests that incumbent politicians pursue 
policies that increase their odds of being re-elected.
34
 Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff 
(1990) develop models in which incumbent politicians seek to signal their competence to voters 
by increasing public spending and transfers and reducing taxes. Voters then support these 
incumbent politicians in their bid to stay in power because of the signals sent through the 
distribution of public goods and transfers. In Rogoff and Sibert (1988), electoral cycles in 
macroeconomic and fiscal policy variables are the result of temporary information asymmetries 
on the part of voters and incumbent politicians.  
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 The influence of electoral processes on the distribution of goods and services takes place in a variety of contexts, 
not only in developing countries but also in developed countries. Garrett and Sobel (2003), for instance, find that in 
the United States, states that were more important to the president electorally were more likely to be declared a 
federal disaster area. There were also more disasters declared during election years than in years without elections. 
Kubik and Moran (2003) find evidence for a gubernatorial election cycle in state executions: states have a much 
higher likelihood of executing death row inmates during gubernatorial election years than in other years. 
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Rogoff (1990) develops a model in which incumbent politicians pursue ‘quick-impact’ 
policies—i.e. projects that are highly visible—as a means of improving their re-election 
prospects. As Rogoff (1990: 21) notes, “during election years, governments at all levels often 
engage in a consumption binge, in which taxes are cut, transfers are raised, and government 
spending is distorted toward projects with high immediate visibility.” Electoral cycles often 
occur in tax rates, direct transfer payments (Tufte, 1978; Drazen, 2001; Bohn and Meon, 2009; 
Potrafke, 2010) or other in-kind transfers (as evinced in the case of the potato distribution in Iran 
in 2009). 
These election-year expenditure changes may lead to short-run and long-run effects in 
infant mortality. Short-run effects would include direct transfers, the provision of in-kind 
nutritional supplements, potential improvements in government service provision, and other 
immediate benefits, while long-run effects would include the benefits of access to cleaner water, 
better sanitation facilities, and general improvements in infrastructure (in addition to potential 
increases in transparency and accountability due to the holding of elections). 
Most neonatal and infant deaths in the developing world are easily preventable. These 
deaths are often proximately related to pregnancy and neonatal complications, infections, malaria 
exposure, and malnutrition. In many cases, maternal health also suffers as a result of 
malnutrition, poor prenatal care, and micronutrient deficiencies. Neonatal and infant mortality 
can be addressed through a series of relatively low cost preventative measures and 
interventions.
35
 Improvements in public health systems, sanitation facilities, infrastructure, the 
provision of in-kind nutritional supplements and other transfer payments (e.g., [un]conditional 
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 For instance, Kinney et al. (2010: 2) argue that “many scientifically proven health interventions are available for 
maternal, newborn, and child health such as medicines, immunizations, insecticide-treated bed nets, and equipment 
for emergency obstetric care. Yet many African governments are currently underutilizing existing scientific 
knowledge to save women’s and children’s lives.” 
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cash transfer payments), and the expansion of pilot projects are some of the potential channels 
through which elections may be associated with reductions in infant mortality rates. Incumbent 
politicians may also want to increase the number or scope of donor-funded programs prior to an 
election (Desai and Kharas, 2010).  
As noted by Sobel and Pellillo (2011), electoral incentives are often manifested in the 
behavior of the agents and bureaucrats that politicians oversee as well. Consider also that many 
neonatal deaths are related to poor access to maternal health and maternal and neonatal health 
services (Lawn et al., 2009). Because elections provide incentives for politicians to provide 
services for citizens as a means of capturing their votes, it is possible that the provision of 
maternal and neonatal health services increases prior to an election. Improved management may 
also take place around elections. One of the problems with public health services in many 
developing countries is absenteeism among medical staff (Chaudhury, Hammer, Kremer, 
Muralidharan, and Rogers, 2006). While no studies have addressed whether this is the case, 
absenteeism may very well decline during election years if politicians are able to exert a 
sufficient amount of pressure on lower-level bureaucrats to operate more effectively. Survey data 
from Chaudhury, Hammer, Kremer, Muralidharan, and Rogers (2006) suggest that 35 percent of 
health workers do not show up for work in health facilities across Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, 
Peru, and Uganda.  
A fast-growing literature evaluates how conditional cash transfer programs and other 
government expenditures influence individual outcomes. Some of this literature evaluates 
election-year effects on expenditures. Schady (2000) finds that transfer payments through the 
Peruvian Social Fund (Fondo Nacional de Cooperación y Desarrollo Social, or FONCODES) 
increased prior to national elections. FONCONDES projects were targeted in provinces 
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throughout the country that were most politically beneficial (because of supporters and marginal 
voters) as well as in those provinces that were the poorest. Community-based projects that were 
funded by FONCONDES include efforts to improve nutrition, family planning, access to credit, 
education, health, water and sanitation, school breakfasts, and other development objectives.  
Kudamatsu (2011) provides suggestive evidence that democratization in Africa was 
associated with increases in breastfeeding and access to improved sanitation facilities. This may 
also be manifested in the run up to an election. The evidence put forth by Kudamatsu (2011) is 
consistent with the hypothesis that political incentives (particularly those for re-election in a 
newly formed democracy) will influence the provision of public or private goods that improve 
infant mortality rates in developing countries. However, this evidence also suggests that election 
cycles may have a very long lagged effect on infant mortality rates, as improvements in 
infrastructure like sanitation facilities or the diffusion of information about ways to prevent 
infant malnutrition or disease may take a long time to influence infant mortality rates.  
Potrafke (2010) finds evidence of electoral cyclicality in public health expenditures 
among OECD countries. Because political budget cycles are larger in developing countries than 
in developed countries (Shi and Svensson, 2006), there may also be electoral cyclicality in public 
health expenditures across the developing world. However, the time series data on public health 
expenditures that are available for the developing world are not of a sufficient length to 
investigate election-year effects, thus this connection is somewhat speculative.  
Cole (2009) finds that government-owned banks in India increase the provision of 
agricultural credit much more during election years than in years following elections. In 
examining the political budget cycle at the local level, Drazen and Eslava (2010) find that prior 
to municipal elections in Colombia expenditures on infrastructure (roads, power and water 
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plants) increase significantly. Schuknecht (1996) argues that political budget cycles may be 
somewhat stronger in developing countries because of the lack of institutional development.  
3.2.2   Political Instability and Repression 
 
In some countries there has been violence before and/or after elections. If there is voter 
intimidation, repression of protests, or other forms of political instability and violence 
surrounding the holding of an election
36
, then infant mortality rates may actually increase before 
or after an election. Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski (2010), for instance, argue that 
governments may use state-sponsored political repression during electoral cycles if there are few 
constraints on their behavior and there is a political opposition that poses a threat to their power. 
These forms of political instability may be manifested in higher infant mortality rates.
37
  
Another reason to expect an electoral cycle in infant mortality rates (particularly after an 
election) is because of the political instability that often accompanies the end of electoral cycles 
in a number of developing countries. This was most recently evinced after the 2007 elections in 
Kenya, where hundreds of people were killed in the ensuing post-electoral violence. However, 
the experience of post-election political violence is not limited to Kenya and a number of 
developing countries have experienced violence right after (or even before) an election. 
Zimbabwe’s 2000 parliamentary election, for instance, was marked by violence (Laakso, 2002).  
Further, it may be the case that repression or voter intimidation drives increases in infant 
mortality in the run up to an election. Violence against opposition supporters or protestors may 
occur. Clamp-downs on free speech or free media may hinder the spread of information in a 
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 See Laakso (2002) in the context of parliamentary elections in Zimbabwe.  
37
 This illustrates the importance of considering the role played by electoral competitiveness, the level of democracy, 
and other political institutional aspects like whether the country has a presidential or parliamentary system of 
government or a majoritarian electoral rule. In many cases, ‘sham’ elections are held by unaccountable rulers who 
want to signal their openness or competitiveness, even though the actual elections are fraudulent and biased. 
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society. There may also be post-electoral repression of protests against fraud or ballot tampering 
which harm individual citizens. Public health crises may increase and hospitals may become 
overwhelmed.  
 Then again, crime rates may fall prior to elections. Ghosh (2006) uses annual data from 
states in India to assess whether there are electoral cycles in crime rates across the country. The 
evidence suggests that property crimes and violent crimes both decline prior to elections.  
 These effects suggest that the degree of democracy or electoral competitiveness may 
matter for whether we observe election year effects in infant mortality rates. Yet countries that 
are relatively autocratic may hold elections as well, regardless of their competitiveness. There is 
evidence for electoral cycles under competitive authoritarian regimes in Mexico under the PRI 
(Grier and Grier, 2000; Gonzalez, 2002), Russia between 1995 and 2003 (Akhmedov and 
Zhuravskaya, 2004), Egypt under Hosni Mubarak (Blaydes, 2006), and Malaysia from 1967 to 
1997 (Pepinsky, 2007).  
 Because the expected sign and magnitude of the estimated effect of electoral cycles on 
infant mortality are unknown a priori, the relationship between elections and infant mortality is 
ultimately an empirical question. The results of this investigation could indeed be 
counterintuitive. Grier and Grier (2000), for instance, find evidence of a postelection economic 
collapse in Mexico, but no expansion in economic activity prior to the election. Similarly, it 
could be the case that infant mortality does not decrease prior to an election (because of a long 
and variable lagged effect, for instance, or because there simply is no impact). 
To test whether there is indeed electoral cyclicality in infant mortality rates, I employ a 
cross-country, micro-level panel dataset that covers more than 2.5 million infants across 70 
developing countries between 1975 and 2009. I first consider what happens to infant mortality in 
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a given country and year if there are elections held during that year. I also exploit the fact that the 
data on election dates and infant birth dates are both identifiable at the monthly level to explore 
heterogeneous effects of electoral cycles on either in utero or neonatal/post-neonatal exposure to 
electoral cycles. Further, because electioneering will vary across political contexts (Franzese, 
2002), I consider the roles played by electoral competitiveness and the overall level of 
democracy.  
 
3.3   Data 
 
Micro-level data on infant mortality come from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS).
38
 
The data are collected by assigning sampling clusters (for instance, towns or a collection of 
villages) in a country and then sampling households within these clusters. For the individual-
level recode files that I use in this paper, the surveys are directly administered to women ages 15-
49. The nationally-representative data allow for identification of birth dates for all live births (at 
the monthly level), the date of death (if applicable) and other infant, mother, and household 
specific characteristics through the use of a retrospective birth history component of the surveys. 
Because survey protocols are standardized across countries, these datasets can be combined to 
produce a cross-country panel on health outcomes. Using the DHS data, I therefore develop an 
unbalanced panel of more than 2.5 million infants across 70 developing countries. Information 
on the countries, survey years, and birth year coverage are presented in Table  3.1.  
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Table  3.1:  Developing Countries in Sample 
Country Survey 
Years 
Birth Year Coverage Obs 
    
Armenia 2000, 2005 1989-2004 7207 
Azerbaijan 2006 1995-2005 4749 
Bangladesh 1994; 1996-97; 1999-2000; 2004; 2007 1982-2006 69504 
Benin 1996; 2001; 2006 1985-2005 48539 
Bolivia 1989; 1994; 1998; 2003; 2008 1978-2007 75157 
Brazil 1986; 1991; 1996 1975-1995 24307 
Burkina Faso 1993; 1999; 2003 1981-2002 41650 
Burundi 1987 1976-1986 6507 
Cambodia 2000; 2005 1989-2005 36629 
Cameroon 1991; 1998; 2004 1980-2003 28074 
Cent. Af. Rep. 1994-95 1983-1994 8831 
Chad 1996-97; 2004 1985-2003 24220 
Colombia 1986; 1990; 1995; 2000; 2005 1975-2009 97228 
Comoros 1996 1985-1995 3830 
Congo 2005 1994-2004 8199 
Congo (DRC) 2007 1996-2006 15164 
Cote d'Ivoire 1994; 1998-99 1983-1998 16842 
Dom. Rep. 1986; 1991; 1996; 1999; 2002; 2007 1975-2006 72949 
Ecuador 1987 1975-1986 5837 
Egypt 1988; 1992; 1995; 2000; 2003; 2005; 2008 1977-2007 140507 
El Salvador 1985 1975-1984 4747 
Ethiopia 2000 1989-1999 20557 
Gabon 2001 1989-1999 8081 
Ghana 1993; 1998; 2003; 2008 1977-2007 32387 
Guatemala 1987; 1995; 1998-99 1976-1998 35560 
Guinea 1999; 2005 1988-2004 24423 
Haiti 1994-95; 2000; 2005-06 1983-2005 29926 
Honduras 2005-06 1994-2005 22484 
India 1993; 1998-99; 2005-2006 1981-2005 359020 
Indonesia 1987; 1991; 1994; 1997; 2002-03; 2007 1976-2006 191944 
Jordan 1990; 1997; 2002; 2007 1979-2008 76156 
Kazakhstan 1995; 1999 1984-1998 6534 
Kenya 1989; 1993; 1998; 2003; 2008-09 1977-2008 57071 
Kyrgyz Rep. 1997 1986-1996 4074 
Lesotho 2004; 2009 1993-2008 12993 
Liberia 1986; 2007 1975-2006 19329 
Madagascar 1992; 1997; 2003-04; 2008-09 1981-2008 54318 
Malawi 2004 1981-2004 46453 
Mali 1995-96; 2001; 2006 1976-2005 76827 
Mexico 1987 1976-1986 10213 
Moldova 2005 1994-2004 3124 
Morocco 1987; 1992; 2003-04 1976-2003 34159 
Mozambique 1997; 2003 1986-2002 31027 
Namibia 1992; 2000; 2006-07 1981-2006 23043 
Nicaragua 1998; 2001 1986-2000 31480 
Niger 1992; 1998; 2006 1981-2005 45284 
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Nigeria 1990; 1999; 2003; 2008 1979-2007 89498 
Pakistan 1990-91; 2006-07 1979-1990 1995-2006 32774 
Paraguay 1990 1979-1989 7778 
Peru 1986; 1991-92; 1996; 2000; 2007-08 1975-2007 120826 
Philippines 1993; 1998; 2003; 2008 1982-2007 59111 
Rwanda 1992; 2000; 2005; 2007-08 1981-2007 47950 
Senegal 1986; 1992-93; 1997; 2005 1975-2004 51425 
Sierra Leone 2008 1997-2007 10897 
South Africa 1998 1986-1997 10000 
Sri Lanka 1987 1975-1986 8244 
Sudan 1989-1990 1978-1989 12664 
Swaziland 2006-07 1995-2006 5065 
Tanzania 1991-92; 1996; 1999; 2004-05 1980-2004 46639 
Thailand 1987 1976-1986 7531 
Togo 1998 1977-1997 18700 
Trinidad  1987 1976-1986 3636 
Tunisia 1988 1977-1987 8282 
Turkey 1993; 1998; 2003 1982-2003 24526 
Uganda 1988-89; 1995; 2000-01; 2006 1977-2005 48144 
Ukraine 2007 1996-2006 2580 
Uzbekistan 1996 1985-1995 4744 
Vietnam 1997; 2002 1986-2001 12688 
Yemen 1991-1992 1990 1072 
Zambia 1992; 1996; 2001-02; 2007 1980-2006 46082 
Zimbabwe 1989; 1994; 1999; 2005-06 1977-2005 29842 
 
From the DHS data, I construct a binary indicator,          , which takes on a value of 
‘1’ if child   dies before or at the age of one year and a value of ‘0’ if otherwise.39 Because I am 
interested in how electoral cycles influence infant mortality rates in terms of deaths per 1,000 
live births, I multiply this measure by 1,000. The coefficient estimates below are therefore in 
terms of infant deaths per 1,000 live births.  
Information on election dates come from the Database of Political Institutions. I construct 
a binary indicator,         , which takes on a value of ‘1’ if there is an election in a particular 
year in a given country and ‘0’ otherwise.
40
 I interact this variable with a number of measures of 
political institutions to examine whether different types of political institutions matter for the 
                                                 
39
 Because of potential ‘age heaping’ of the infant mortality data at 12 months (i.e., because the DHS data are 
retrospective birth histories, mothers may ‘round up’ the dates of the deaths of their children), I define infant 
mortality as death within the first 12 months of life. 
40
 Using this definition, about 25 percent of all year observations are election years.  
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effects of elections on infant mortality rates (e.g., presidential versus parliamentary systems of 
government).  
I also use a measure of electoral competitiveness from the Database of Political 
Institutions,                , which measures the degree of electoral competitiveness and 
ranges from 0 (completely non-competitive) to 7 (competitive).
41
 Electoral cyclicality in infant 
mortality rates may only be likely if elections are sufficiently competitive, thus it is important to 
consider the interaction between elections and electoral competitiveness.  I also obtain 
information on political institutions from the Polity IV database. I use the         regime 
measure, which takes on a value of -10 for completely autocratic regimes and a value of +10 for 
completely democratic regimes. Across the entire panel, the average         score is 1.13.  
Data on real GDP per person and growth in GDP per person come from the World Bank 
(2011). The level of income per person is in terms of U.S. dollars (2000) and is adjusted for 
differences in purchasing power across countries (PPP). The logarithm of real GDP per person is 
used in all specifications below. I use a number of control variables in the analysis below. In 
addition to the level and growth rate of real GDP per person, I control for whether the household 
is located in a rural area of the country, an indicator for male gender, an indicator for multiple 
births, and cubic polynomials in mother’s age at the time of birth, years of education, and infant 
birth order (Baird, Friedman, and Schady, 2011). All regressions include a constant term which 
is not reported in the tables below.  
Summary statistics are presented in Table  3.2. Birth years span from 1975 to 2009 across 
the sample, with the bulk of birth years in the panel taking place in the mid to late 1980s and 
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 Specifically, I use the competitiveness score for executive elections if only executive elections took place and the 
competitiveness score for legislative elections if only legislative elections took place. If both executive and 
legislative elections took place at the same time (as is the case for parliamentary systems of government), I take the 
row mean of observations of the competitiveness scores for executive and legislative elections.  
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throughout the 1990s. Across the entire panel, the average infant mortality rate is 78 deaths per 
1,000 live births. Splitting along election years, the average rate is about 74.6 per 1,000 during 
election years and the average rate is 78.9 per 1,000 during non-election years. Among country-
year observations where the Polity score is strictly greater than zero (i.e., relatively more 
democratic country-year observations), the average rate is about 68.8 per 1,000 during election 
years and 71.3 during non-election years. When the Polity score is less than or equal to zero (i.e. 
relatively more autocratic), the average annual infant mortality rate is 84 per 1,000 during 
election years and 87.1 during non-election years. These summary statistics suggest that infant 
mortality rates are relatively lower during election years even across different levels of 
democracy. Countries that are more autocratic have much higher infant mortality rates (see 
Kudamatsu, 2011 for a discussion). Across the entire panel, electoral competitiveness is 
surprisingly low—on average, most countries are closer to having low levels of electoral 
competitiveness (1.4 on a scale of 0 to 7). Most country-year observations considered in the 
sample are for presidential systems of government (about 64 percent) while the other 
observations are close to evenly split between parliamentary systems of government (about 20 
percent) and assembly-elected presidential systems of government (about 16 percent). Most 
individuals live in relatively more rural areas of the country. Average age at birth is about 26 
years, with a standard deviation of around 6 years. Most mothers in the sample have relatively 




Table  3.2:  Summary Statistics 
      
 # Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Infant Mortality 2707842 .0780777 .2682938 0 1 
Infant Mortality (x 1000) 2707842 78.07767 268.2938 0 1000 
Election Year 2668705 .2478592 .4317697 0 1 
Months In Utero Exposure  2702777 2.147836 3.160408 0 9 
Election Competitiveness 2691070 1.422577 2.649814 0 7 
Parliamentary System 2668705 .1995968 .3996974 0 1 
Presidential System 2668705 .6381421 .4805381 0 1 
Assembly-Elected President 2668705 .1622611 .3686902 0 1 
Polity  2693519 1.129213 6.4115 -10 9 
Rural 2702689 .6424524 .479278 0 1 
Male 2707842 .510922 .4998808 0 1 
Real GDP per person, PPP 2572554 2347.76 2012.033 150.807 16015.66 
Log real GDP per person, PPP 2572554 7.458703 .7700905 5.016001 9.681322 
GDP per person, growth rate 2657401 1.635362 5.104959 -46.89249 90.13997 
Age at first birth 2707842 25.61059 5.874245 9.083333 39 
Birth order 2707842 3.283599 2.236269 1 27 
Years of education 2705714 4.297786 4.541368 0 27 
Multiple birth 2707842 .0243825 .1542336 0 1 
Number of births 2522130 2.899063 1.466359 1 16 
      
      
Infant Mortality during Election 
Years (x 1000) 
661463 74.56955 262.6957   
Infant Mortality during Non-election 
Years (x 1000) 
2007242 78.86393 269.5263   
      
      
Infant Mortality during Election 
Years; Polity > 0 (x 1000) 
409751 68.76371 253.0522   
Infant Mortality during Non-election 
Years; Polity >0 (x 1000) 
1047481 71.34831 257.4059   
      
      
Infant Mortality during Election 
Years; Polity <= 0 (x 1000) 
251712 84.02063 277.4193   
Infant Mortality during Non-election 
Years; Polity <=0 (x 1000) 
959761 87.06647 281.9326   
      
      
 While the DHS data provide a rich source of information on individual health outcomes 
across the developing world, they do have their limitations. The DHS data are retrospective in 
nature, which suggests that there may be a few issues with measurement. For instance, there may 
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be ‘recall bias’ where a mother cannot recall the precise month in which her child was born. This 
is likely to be problematic for births that occurred a decade or longer ago. Following Baird, 
Friedman and Schady (2011), I only consider infants who are born within 11 years of survey 
administration. I also discard births to women age 40 or older to avoid issues regarding the 
varying age composition of mothers. I do not use information in infants who were born within 
less than one year of survey administration because of issues with left censoring of the data. 
Another potential limitation of using the DHS data is that infant mortality data are not 
available for infants or children of women who had died, hence the potential for mortality-related 
selection bias. For instance, it is estimated that millions have died in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC) over the past decade, mainly due to public health crises, malnutrition, and poor 
living standards stemming from the civil wars and political instability. It is likely that the infant 
mortality statistics for the DRC and other countries experiencing severe civil war are biased 
downward (in the sense that infant mortality rates may appear to be lower than they actually are) 
due to mortality-related selection bias.  
 
3.4   Methods 
 
To estimate the impact of elections on the likelihood of mortality of infant   born to 
household/mother   in country   in birth year  , I use the following linear probability model:42 
                               
      
         
where            takes on a value of ‘1’ if there is an election in country   in year   and a value 
of ‘0’ otherwise,     is a vector of individual- and household-level characteristics,     is a vector 
of country and year-specific variables, and       is the error term. The vector of individual and 
                                                 
42
 The use of a linear probability model in this context follows the work of Bhalotra (2010), Kudamatsu (2011), 
Kudamatsu, Perrson, and Stromberg (2011). 
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household characteristics,    , includes whether the household is located in a rural area of the 
country at the time of interview, the gender of the infant, whether the infant was a multiple birth 
(i.e. twin, triplet, etc.), and cubic polynomials in mother’s age at the time of birth, years of 
education, and infant birth order.
43
   
The vector of country and year-specific variables,    
 , includes the log of real per capita 
income (constant, 2000 US$, adjusted for purchasing power differences across countries) and the 
growth rate of GDP per capita. Because elections are not randomly assigned and the election 
year effects may pick up the impact of democracy on infant mortality rates, I also include the 
Polity score of autocracy/democracy in the vector of country and year-specific variables.
44
  
Observations of the error term are clustered at the country level to control for unobserved 
similarities among infants born within the same country as well as to ensure that the estimates 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The coefficient of interest is  , which 
measures the impact of having an election in country   in year   on infant mortality conditional 
on the included covariates. 
To control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries, I estimate the linear probability 
model above with country fixed effects:  
                                
      
         
By including country-specific fixed effects, I am able to identify the effect of an election on 
infant mortality from the deviation within each country from the mean infant mortality rate. 
Because of how the DHS data are structured, I am also able to include mother-level fixed effects. 
While I control for mother’s education, birth order, gender, location of the home (i.e., rural 
                                                 
43
 See Baird, Friedman, and Schady (2011). 
44
 Specifically, I use the         measure.  
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versus urban), and other observable characteristics, allowing the panel unit to be the mother takes 
all unobserved heterogeneity at the household or mother level into account: 
                                   
      
         
 
Here, I identify the effect of an election on infant mortality by the deviation within each 
household/mother from the household mean. The inclusion of mother fixed effects helps control 
for endogenous selection into the full sample of births (Bhalotra, 2010; Baird, Friedman, and 
Schadu, 2011). While the mother fixed effects panel regression approach allows for the control 
of unobserved, time-invariant mother characteristics, it does have the disadvantage of limiting 
the sample to those women who have had more than one live birth. I present pooled OLS 
regression results from the restricted sample in order to compare the results between the 
restricted sample and the full sample. This is an unbalanced panel in that the unit of observation 
is the mother/household and the time dimension is the birth year for every child. I also include 
either birth year fixed effects or country-specific linear trends in the specifications reported in 
Tables 3-6 below.  
 In a number of specifications, I interact the election variable with the electoral 
competitiveness variable to allow the impact of elections on infant mortality to differ depending 
on how competitive each election is. Including this interaction effect is also important to prevent 
confounding the effects of institutional quality or competitiveness with elections (see, for 
instance, Persson and Tabellini, 2005). When elections are not free and fair, there may be violent 
election campaigning (as in the case of Zimbabwe in the 2000 parliamentary election [Laakso, 
2002]) or few incentives for incumbent politicians or rulers to provide benefits to citizens. 
However, a literature examines some of the other explanations for increases in transfer payments 
and government spending prior to elections even in authoritarian regimes where there is little 
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electoral competition. The reasons for these fiscal policies may be oriented around a regime 
seeking legitimacy or control over an opposition group, even if the elections are not per se 
competitive. 
 
3.5   Results 
 
The baseline results are presented in Table  3.3.
45
 When only considering the pooled OLS 
regression results, it appears that the holding of any election is associated with a reduction in 
infant mortality of about 2.4 per 1,000 (Table  3.3, Panel A). However, the coefficient from the 
panel regression results using country fixed effects is about half this magnitude (1.3 per 1,000) 
and the impact is generally minor in magnitude and statistically insignificant when including 
birth year fixed effects, time trends, or mother fixed effects. When birth year fixed effects are 
included in the regressions, I find no evidence that infant mortality rates change over the 
electoral cycle. However, I also find no evidence that the overall level of income matters for 
infant mortality when the birth year fixed effects are included, which suggests that the secular 
decline in infant mortality rates due to technology and information diffusion may matter more 
than the overall level of income for explaining infant mortality rates. When I include the Polity 
score as a covariate, the magnitude of the electoral year effects is diminished. The statistical 
significance and magnitude of democracy is seriously mitigated when year fixed effects or 
country-specific linear time trends are considered as additional covariates. 
                                                 
45
 In all tables, the results are presented as follows: column 1 presents estimates from pooled OLS regressions; 
column 2 presents estimates from country fixed effects panel regressions; column 3 includes birth year fixed effects 
along with country fixed effects; column 4 allows for country specific linear trends in infant mortality in addition to 
the country fixed effects; column 5 presents results from pooled OLS regressions for  which the sample is restricted 
to only those mothers who have had at least two births; column 6 presents results from mother fixed effects panel 
regressions, column 7 augments these regressions with birth year fixed effects, and lastly, column 8 allows for the 
inclusion of country-specific linear trends along with mother fixed effects. Panel A presents the results without 
controlling for the Polity score while Panel B presents the results when controlling for Polity.  
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Table  3.3:  Election Year Effects on Infant Mortality Rates 
 
Panel A: Election Year Effects 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 























         
Covariates YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE NO YES YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Mother FE NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth-year FE NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Trends NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES 
Sample Full Full Full Full Restricted Restricted Restricted Restricted 
# Countries 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
# Observations 2522130 2522130 2522130 2522130 2088328 2088328 2088328 2088328 
 
Panel B: Controlling for Polity Score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


















































         
Covariates YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE NO YES YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Mother FE NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth-year FE NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Trends NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES 
Sample Full Full Full Full Restricted Restricted Restricted Restricted 
# Countries 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
# Observations 2522130 2522130 2522130 2522130 2088328 2088328 2088328 2088328 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator of infant mortality (multiplied by 1,000). Standard errors 
clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: * p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Covariates include the level and growth rate of GDP per person (log terms, constant 2000 
U.S. dollars, adjusted for purchasing power differences across countries), whether the household is located in a rural 
area of the country, an indicator for male gender, an indicator for multiple births, and cubic polynomials in mother’s 
age at the time of birth, years of education, and infant birth order. A constant term is included in each regression but 
is not reported.   
 
 To control for how different political institutions may influence whether there are 
electoral cycles in infant mortality, I interact the election variable with a measure of electoral 
competitiveness from the Database of Political Institutions. Recall that this measure captures the 
degree of competitiveness of an election, ranging from 0 (completely non-competitive) to 7 
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(competitive). Table  3.4 presents the results form regressions with the elections and the 
interaction effects. I present the F-test statistics which indicate the joint statistical significance 
between the election variable and the interaction variable. Generally, the results are only jointly 
statistically significant when considering the pooled OLS regressions for the full and restricted 
samples and the country fixed effects panel regressions. The results indicate that what may 
matter for whether there are election year influences on infant mortality rates is whether there is 
a high degree of electoral competition. Without competition, there are weaker incentives for 
incumbent politicians to pursue expansionary policies or policies aimed at providing the rural 
poor with public and private goods and services in order to ‘buy’ their votes.   
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Table  3.4:  Election Year Effects on Infant Mortality Rates 
 
Panel A: Election Year Effects and Interaction with Electoral Competitiveness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 























         



























 0.86 0.27 9.06
***
 1.23 0.66 1.05 
Covariates YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE NO YES YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Mother FE NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth-year FE NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Trends NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES 
Sample Full Full Full Full Restricted Restricted Restricted Restricted 
# Countries 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
# Observations 2522130 2522130 2522130 2522130 2088328 2088328 2088328 2088328 
 
Panel B: Controlling for Polity Score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 























         























































 0.86 0.28 5.87
***
 1.13 0.58 1.05 
Covariates YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE NO YES YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Mother FE NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth-year FE NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Trends NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES 
Sample Full Full Full Full Restrict Restrict Restrict Restrict 
# Countries 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
# Observations 2522130 2522130 2522130 2522130 2088328 2088328 2088328 2088328 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator of infant mortality (multiplied by 1,000). Standard errors 
clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: * p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Covariates include the level and growth rate of GDP per person (log terms, constant 2000 
U.S. dollars, adjusted for purchasing power differences across countries), whether the household is located in a rural 
area of the country, an indicator for male gender, an indicator for multiple births, and cubic polynomials in mother’s 
age at the time of birth, years of education, and infant birth order. A constant term is included in each regression but 
is not reported.  The F-test statistic is for the null hypothesis that the parameters on the election variable and the 




Table  3.5 restricts the regressions for only those country-year observations with a Polity 
score greater than 0. Incumbent politicians may be less prone to pursuing expansionary policies 
in the run up to an election if government institutions are relatively more autocratic. The 
coefficient estimates are much larger in magnitude, suggesting that countries with relatively 
more democratic institutions will experience stronger election year effects on infant mortality. 
This is an intuitive result considering that many purely autocratic countries put forth ‘sham’ 
elections as a means to signal competitiveness of executive recruitment and accountability to 
citizens. Column 7 presents evidence for mother fixed effects panel regressions with birth year 
fixed effects. The results suggest that the only time an electoral cycle would be associated with 
reductions in infant mortality is when the degree of electoral competitiveness is sufficiently high. 
However, the F-test statistic for joint significance is relatively low, so it is difficult to calculate 
with any great deal of precision how these effects are influencing infant mortality rates. The 
results from the country fixed effects panel regression estimates suggest that elections would 
have to be almost completely competitive for electoral cycles to exert any negative influence on 
infant mortality rates among those country-year observations where the Polity measure is strictly 
greater than zero. Additionally, once controlling for the impact of political regime (via Polity), 




Table  3.5:  Election Year Effects on Infant Mortality Rates - Interaction with 
Electoral Competitiveness Variable 
 
Panel A: Only for Country-Year Observations with Polity > 0 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




































































Covariates YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE NO YES YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Mother FE NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth-year FE NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Trends NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES 
Sample Polity > 0 Polity > 0 Polity > 0 Polity > 0 Restricted 
- Polity > 0 
Restricted 
- Polity > 0 
Restricted 
- Polity > 0 
Restricted 
- Polity > 0 
# Countries 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
# Observations 1421049 1421049 1421049 1421049 1090431 1090431 1090431 1090431 
 
Panel B: Controlling for Polity Score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 



























         

























































 2.38 0.58 
Covariates YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE NO YES YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Mother FE NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth-year FE NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Trends NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES 





- Polity > 
0 
Restricted 
- Polity > 
0 
Restricted 
- Polity > 
0 
Restricted 
- Polity > 
0 
# Countries 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
# Observations 1421049 1421049 1421049 1421049 1090431 1090431 1090431 1090431 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator of infant mortality (multiplied by 1,000). Standard errors 
clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: * p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Covariates include the level and growth rate of GDP per person (log terms, constant 2000 
U.S. dollars, adjusted for purchasing power differences across countries), whether the household is located in a rural 
area of the country, an indicator for male gender, an indicator for multiple births, and cubic polynomials in mother’s 
age at the time of birth, years of education, and infant birth order. A constant term is included in each regression but 
is not reported.  The F-test statistic is for the null hypothesis that the parameters on the election variable and the 
interaction variable are both equal to zero.  
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Table  3.6 presents results from election year interactions with parliamentary, presidential, 
and assembly-elected presidential systems of government. Among the different systems of 
government, countries with parliamentary governments appear to have the strongest election year 
effects on infant mortality. However, once controlling for unobserved heterogeneity through the 
use of fixed effects and unobserved year effects and trends in infant mortality, there appears to 





Table  3.6:  Election Year Effects on Infant Mortality Rates - Interactions with 


































































 0.03 1.00 9.45
***
 1.61 0.75 2.17 
 
Panel B 
        











































 0.33 0.85 3.50
**
 1.34 0.95 1.02 
 
Panel C 
        

















































 0.41 0.72 4.81
*
 0.77 0.72 0.68 
Covariates YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE NO YES YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Mother FE NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth-year FE NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Trends NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES 
Sample Full Full Full Full Restricted Restricted Restricted Restricted 
# Countries 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
# Obs. 2522130 2522130 2522130 2522130 2088328 2088328 2088328 2088328 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator of infant mortality (multiplied by 1,000). Standard errors 
clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: * p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Covariates include the level and growth rate of GDP per person (log terms, constant 2000 
U.S. dollars, adjusted for purchasing power differences across countries), whether the household is located in a rural 
area of the country, an indicator for male gender, an indicator for multiple births, and cubic polynomials in mother’s 
age at the time of birth, years of education, and infant birth order. A constant term is included in each regression but 
is not reported. Panel A is for the election interaction with a parliamentary system of government, while Panels B 
and C are for presidential and assembly-elected presidential systems of government, respectively. The F-test statistic 





3.6   Timing of Election Dates and Infant Birth Dates 
 
Identifying whether changes in infant mortality are related to election cycles may be difficult 
because of how the timing of elections aligns with infant birth dates and in utero, neonatal, and 
post-neonatal exposure to election cycles.  In the specifications above, I examine whether infant 
mortality is influenced by whether there is an election in a given year. However, in many cases 
an infant may be exposed to an electoral cycle not only in the specific year in which she or he 
was born but also over the span of two different years. Consider that the 1988 legislative election 
in Haiti was held in November. If there were changes in fiscal policy prior to an election, an 
infant born in the beginning of 1989 would be exposed to these fluctuations in transfer payments 
or health service availability in utero. The above specifications would not adequately capture the 
effects of an election on infant mortality.
46
 
 In this section, I explore whether differences in the timing of election dates and birth 
dates influence whether an infant is exposed to electoral cycles. I construct four different 
variables which capture differences in exposure windows. The first variable (     ) captures in 
utero exposure to an election prior to the election. The second variable (     ) captures in utero 
exposure to an election after the election. The third variable (     ) captures neonatal or post-
neonatal exposure to an election before the election. The last variable (     ) captures neonatal 
or post-neonatal exposure to an election after the election.  
                                                 
46
 As Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney (2006: 102) note, at the macro-level public health improvements often 
involve large public works like the development of infrastructure to clean water, the provision of better sanitation 
facilities, mass vaccination campaigns, and other health interventions. These projects may take place more than one 
year prior to an election or they may begin very close to the election (i.e. ‘quick impact’ projects). This suggests that 
there may not be annual election year effects in infant mortality and that the response could be somewhat lagged. 
However, in the above specifications, I find very little evidence of lag or lead effects of elections on infant mortality 
rates. The magnitude for the election-year effects on infant mortality is the largest, followed by the lead effects and 
lastly by the lag effects.  
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Each variable is constructed on the basis of the monthly difference between the infant 
birth month and the election month. For example, if an infant was born in April 2010 and there 
was an election in July 2010, this observation for the variable       would be 9 months because 
the infant would be exposed in utero to an election cycle prior to an election for about 9 months. 
The measure       would be 0 months (because the infant was born before the election), the 
measure       would be 3 months (because the infant was exposed after being born to the 
election cycle), and the measure       would be 9 months (because the infant was exposed 
after being born to the election cycle after the election had taken place). Table  3.7 provides 




Table  3.7:  Examples of Birth Months and Election Months and Definitions of 
Variables 
Birth (B) Election (E) (B-E) IUE_b IUE_a PUE_b PUE_a 
June, 2009 July, 2010 -13 0 0 0 0 
July, 2009 July, 2010 -12 0 0 12 0 
August, 2009 July, 2010 -11 1 0 11 1 
September, 2009 July, 2010 -10 2 0 10 2 
October, 2009 July, 2010 -9 3 0 9 3 
November, 2009 July, 2010 -8 4 0 8 4 
December, 2009 July, 2010 -7 5 0 7 5 
January, 2010 July, 2010 -6 6 0 6 6 
February, 2010 July, 2010 -5 7 0 5 7 
March, 2010 July, 2010 -4 8 0 4 8 
April, 2010 July, 2010 -3 9 0 3 9 
May, 2010 July, 2010 -2 9 0 2 10 
June, 2010 July, 2010 -1 9 0 1 11 
July, 2010 July, 2010 0 9 0 0 12 
August, 2010 July, 2010 1 8 1 0 11 
September, 2010 July, 2010 2 7 2 0 10 
October, 2010 July, 2010 3 6 3 0 9 
November, 2010 July, 2010 4 5 4 0 8 
December, 2010 July, 2010 5 4 5 0 7 
January, 2011 July, 2010 6 3 6 0 6 
February, 2011 July, 2010 7 2 7 0 5 
March, 2011 July, 2010 8 1 8 0 4 
April, 2011 July, 2010 9 0 9 0 3 
May, 2011 July, 2010 10 0 9 0 2 
June, 2011 July, 2010 11 0 9 0 1 
July, 2011 July, 2010 12 0 9 0 0 
August, 2011 July, 2010 13 0 0 0 0 
 
Because the differences between birth months and election months may become quite large (i.e. 
an infant born in July 2007 could be exposed in utero to an election in July 2010), I taper the 
windows in which infants are exposed to elections. For instance, instead of allowing in utero 
exposure before an election to reach a high level, I begin to taper this number down. An infant 
born in April 2010 when there is a July 2010 election would have 9 months of in utero exposure 
prior to the election, but an infant born in March 2010 would have 8 months of in utero 
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exposure. In essence, I cap the exposure windows to one year before and one year after the 
election cycle in order to constrain the effects of elections on infant mortality for a specific time 
period. There are likely many ways to create these variables for capturing exposure to elections 
and the evidence in this section should be seen as suggestive but not conclusive.
47
  
I now seek to estimate the parameters of the following linear probability model: 
                              
      
          
 
  is now the impact of an additional month of in utero exposure to an election cycle for infant   
on infant mortality. In the regression results reported below, I control for either country fixed 
effects or mother fixed effects and cluster the observations of error term at the country level to 
control for arbitrary correlation among infant births at the country level. I further include birth-
year/cohort fixed effects or country-specific linear trends in infant mortality to control for time 
dimensions and trends in infant mortality. I report only estimates of in utero exposure to electoral 
cycles. All the other results for neonatal or post-neonatal exposure were generally insignificant, 
though still relevant for empirical testing.
48
 
 The results for regressions where in utero exposure to election cycles is the key 
explanatory variable are very similar to those presented in Section 5. The strongest evidence for 
electoral cycles in infant mortality rates is found when the sample is restricted to only those 
countries with Polity scores strictly greater than zero. Column 7 in Table  3.9 presents regression 
results from mother fixed effects panel regressions with birth year fixed effects. The coefficient 
estimates suggest that an additional month of in utero exposure to an election cycle would be 
associated with an increase in the infant mortality rate if elections were completely non-
                                                 
47
 There are some limitations to this strategy. For instance, I examine an in utero exposure window of 9 months. 
This is likely to be a reasonable approximation for most pregnancies. 
48
 Results for the other exposure windows are available from the author upon request.  
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competitive. Elections would have to be nearly fully competitive for infant mortality rates to fall 
prior to an election. The impact of democracy appears to make evidence for election year 
cyclicality in infant mortality disappear, even when restricting the sample to those countries with 
relatively young democracies. All results for different specifications are presented in Table  3.8, 




Table  3.8:  In Utero Exposure to the Election Cycle 
 
Panel A: Months of In Utero Exposure to Elections 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 























         
Covariates YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE NO YES YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Mother FE NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth-year FE NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Trends NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES 
Sample Full Full Full Full Restricted Restricted Restricted Restricted 
# Countries 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 
# Observations 2551099 2551099 2551099 2551099 2119752 2119752 2119752 2119752 
  
Panel B: Controlling for Polity Score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


















































Covariates YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE NO YES YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Mother FE NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth-year FE NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Trends NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES 
Sample Full Full Full Full Restricted Restricted Restricted Restricted 
# Countries 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 
# Observations 2542586 2542586 2542586 2542586 2111089 2111089 2111089 2111089 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator of infant mortality (multiplied by 1,000). Standard errors 
clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: * p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Covariates include the level and growth rate of GDP per person (log terms, constant 2000 
U.S. dollars, adjusted for purchasing power differences across countries), whether the household is located in a rural 
area of the country, an indicator for male gender, an indicator for multiple births, and cubic polynomials in mother’s 
age at the time of birth, years of education, and infant birth order. A constant term is included in each regression but 





Table  3.9:  In Utero Exposure to the Election Cycle 
 
Panel A: Interaction with Electoral Competitiveness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 























         



























 0.90 0.27 5.30
***
 1.23 0.62 0.79 
Covariates YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE NO YES YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Mother FE NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth-year FE NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Trends NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES 
Sample Full Full Full Full Restricted Restricted Restricted Restricted 
# Countries 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 
# Obs. 2517068 2517068 2517068 2517068 2084526 2084526 2084526 2084526 
 
Panel B: Controlling for Polity Score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
















         















































 2.32 0.36 0.16 2.48
*
 0.38 0.27 0.42 
Covariates YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE NO YES YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Mother FE NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth-year FE NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Trends NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES 
Sample Full Full Full Full Restricted Restricted Restricted Restricted 
# Countries 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 
# Observations 2539420 2539420 2539420 2539420 2108799 2108799 2108799 2108799 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator of infant mortality (multiplied by 1,000). Standard errors 
clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: * p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Covariates include the level and growth rate of GDP per person (log terms, constant 2000 
U.S. dollars, adjusted for purchasing power differences across countries), whether the household is located in a rural 
area of the country, an indicator for male gender, an indicator for multiple births, and cubic polynomials in mother’s 
age at the time of birth, years of education, and infant birth order. A constant term is included in each regression but 
is not reported.  The F-test statistic is for the null hypothesis that the parameters on the election variable and the 




Table  3.10:  In Utero Exposure to the Election Cycle - Interaction with 
Electoral Competitiveness 
 
Panel A: Only for Country-Year Observations with Polity > 0 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 



























         






































Covariates YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE NO YES YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Mother FE NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth-year FE NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Trends NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES 
Sample Polity > 0 Polity > 0 Polity > 0 Polity > 0 Restricted 
- Polity > 0 
Restricted 
- Polity > 0 
Restricted 
- Polity > 0 
Restricted - 
Polity > 0 
# Countries 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
# Obs. 1421049 1421049 1421049 1421049 1090431 1090431 1090431 1090431 
 
Panel B: Controlling for Polity Score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
















         











































F-Test 2.06 1.80 0.76 0.21 2.06 0.73 1.72 0.36 
Covariates YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE NO YES YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Mother FE NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth-year FE NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Trends NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES 









- Polity > 0 
Restricted 
- Polity > 0 
Restricted 
- Polity > 0 
Restricted 
- Polity > 0 
# Countries 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
# Observations 1421049 1421049 1421049 1421049 1090431 1090431 1090431 1090431 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator of infant mortality (multiplied by 1,000). Standard errors 
clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: * p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Covariates include the level and growth rate of GDP per person (log terms, constant 2000 
U.S. dollars, adjusted for purchasing power differences across countries), whether the household is located in a rural 
area of the country, an indicator for male gender, an indicator for multiple births, and cubic polynomials in mother’s 
age at the time of birth, years of education, and infant birth order. A constant term is included in each regression but 
is not reported.  The F-test statistic is for the null hypothesis that the parameters on the election variable and the 
interaction variable are both equal to zero. 
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Table  3.11:  In Utero Exposure to the Election Cycle - Interactions with 



























































         
F-Test 9.91
***
 2.07 0.36 1.76 8.72
***
 1.53 0.59 1.04 
 
Panel B 
        






















































         
F-Test 2.91
*
 1.94 0.59 1.89 2.59
*
 2.07 1.68 1.67 
 
Panel C 
        










































         
F-Test 3.36
**
 1.51 0.25 0.89 4.17
**
 1.07 1.35 1.17 
Covariates YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE NO YES YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Mother FE NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth-year FE NO NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Trends NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES 
Sample Full Full Full Full Restricted Restricted Restricted Restricted 
# Countries 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 
# Obs. 2517068 2517068 2517068 2517068 2084526 2084526 2084526 2084526 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator of infant mortality (multiplied by 1,000). Standard errors 
clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: * p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Covariates include the level and growth rate of GDP per person (log terms, constant 2000 
U.S. dollars, adjusted for purchasing power differences across countries), whether the household is located in a rural 
area of the country, an indicator for male gender, an indicator for multiple births, and cubic polynomials in mother’s 
age at the time of birth, years of education, and infant birth order. A constant term is included in each regression but 
is not reported. Panel A is for the election interaction with a parliamentary system of government, while Panels B 
and C are for presidential and assembly-elected presidential systems of government, respectively. The F-test statistic 





3.7   Conclusion 
 
Across the developing world, infant mortality rates exhibit a remarkable amount of 
variation, both across and within countries and over time. Most studies to date have focused on 
economic, environmental, and disease ecological explanations for fluctuations in infant mortality 
rates, yet few studies have addressed whether there are systematic variations in infant mortality 
rates as a result of political economy factors.  
This paper expands the literature on ‘election economics’ by testing whether electoral 
cycles shape individual-level health outcomes across the developing world. I find only limited 
evidence for electoral cyclicality in infant mortality rates. The strongest evidence is for those 
countries that have relatively higher levels of democracy but also for those countries with 
relatively younger democracies. In matching election dates and infant birth dates, I find 
suggestive but limited evidence that in utero exposure to election cycles is associated with 
reductions in infant mortality rates. More research (and data) is needed to evaluate the potential 








Chapter 4  
 
Economic Reconstruction Amidst Conflict – Insights from 
Afghanistan and Iraq 
 
 
4.1   Introduction 
 
Economic reconstruction involves fundamentally transforming a society’s economic institutions 
in order to foster growth and development as well as to resolve perceived economic and social 
problems. In many conflict and post-conflict settings, infrastructure has been destroyed and 
roads, power stations, water pipelines, hospitals, schools, and sewerage facilities must be 
completely rebuilt. In addition to the destruction of physical capital, human capital and social 
capital are seriously damaged by conflict. The economic reconstruction process as a whole 
therefore involves rebuilding infrastructure, restoring physical, social, and human capital, and 
restructuring fiscal, monetary, and trade policies in order to allow for a robust private sector to 
emerge.  
 Historically, economic reconstruction has taken place following the end of conflict, as in 
the cases of post-World War II Japan and West Germany. However, in more recent foreign 
interventions such as Afghanistan and Iraq, economic reconstruction has been viewed as part of a 
broader strategy to “win the hearts and minds” of domestic political authorities, citizens, and 
insurgents in order to end conflict. Economic reconstruction in such contexts has proven to be 
highly complex and uncertain. 
There have been many successful reconstruction projects and reforms in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq—the rebuilding of schools, hospitals, and infrastructure has taken place 
despite the presence of violent insurgencies. School enrollment has skyrocketed in Afghanistan, 
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and girls, who were previously unable to attend school under Taliban rule, now comprise a third 
of the country’s education enrollment (Isby 2010; Miliband 2010).  
However, there have also been significant setbacks due to ongoing conflict in addition to 
a variety of other factors discussed in this paper. For instance, insurgents often target aid workers 
as well as infrastructure projects that have been administered by foreign reconstruction 
authorities. In Iraq, for instance, insurgents often targeted oil pipelines and other major 
infrastructure programs administered by the U.S. and its allies. Gul Agha Ahmadi, a spokesman 
for the Ministry of Education in Afghanistan, has reported that around 60 schools have been 
burned down in 2010 at the time of writing (Norland 2010). 
Despite the importance of economic reconstruction, the topic has received relatively little 
attention from the academic community. As Del Castillo (2008: 19-20) notes, “…economic 
reconstruction has been a much-neglected aspect of the extensive and fast-growing literature on 
war-to-peace transitions.” This is especially the case in the context of ongoing insurgencies in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature by analyzing 
economic reconstruction amidst ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Our analysis is situated in multiple strands of related literature. Since post-conflict 
reconstruction typically involves social and economic change in the broadest sense, some of the 
literature on the topic assesses the multiple facets of rebuilding a society’s economic, legal, 
political, and social institutions in the wake of conflict (see Kumar 1998; Ikenberry 2001; 
Bastian, Sunil, and Robin Luckham 2003; Chimni 2003; Demekas, McHugh, and Kosma 2003; 
Williams 2003; Coyne 2008; Coyne and Boettke 2009). Others provide historical contexts for 
reconstruction activities or critically assess international donors’ plans for development in 
postconflict societies (Montgomery and Rondinelli 2004). Another strand of literature on 
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reconstruction has focused more specifically on the economic aspects of reconstruction, such as 
fiscal and monetary policies or infrastructural development. For example, the contributors to the 
volume edited by Boyce (1996) explore the economic policies conducive to peace based on 
reconstruction experiences in El Salvador. Boyce (2002) highlights the role of conditional aid in 
encouraging domestic investment in peace. Adam et al. (2008) analyze the role played by aid in 
monetary reconstruction. Del Castillo (2008) emphasizes that post-conflict economic 
reconstruction is a multi-pronged challenge which involves standard issues of socio-economic 
development as well as the need to consolidate peace and provide basic services to citizens. 
Collier (2009) analyzes whether post-conflict economic policies should be distinctive from those 
adopted in equally poor, but peaceful, countries. 
Our analysis differs from, and contributes to, this existing literature in several important 
ways. First, in contrast to the first category of literature on post-conflict reconstruction, we focus 
on one specific aspect of reconstruction—reforming economic institutions and policies. Second, 
the existing literature tends to neglect the different incentives and constraints facing the array of 
actors involved in economic reconstruction—domestic and foreign policymakers, aid workers 
and development experts, members of the military, diplomats, etc. Currently, much of the 
literature is focused on identifying the challenges involved in economic reconstruction, as well as 
the ideal policies necessary to address these challenges. While identifying challenges and 
solutions is clearly important, it is only part of the story. Also important is the ability to actually 
design and implement policies in a way that effectively address the challenges of economic 
reconstruction. Third, our analysis focuses on economic reconstruction in the context of ongoing 
insurgencies. Much of the existing literature is focused on economic reconstruction efforts that 
take place in post-conflict settings and therefore assumes that economic reconstruction takes 
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place in an environment where conflict is minimal or has altogether ended. However, as the 
insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate, this has not recently been the case. Given our 
focus on economic reconstruction amidst ongoing conflict and insurgency, our analysis places 
particular emphasis on the role played by military officials, in addition to other key players 
involved in economic reconstruction. Neglecting how ongoing conflict and insurgency 
influences economic reconstruction efforts overlooks potential sources of tension between 
various, and often competing, goals—e.g., military, diplomatic, peace building, economic 
reconstruction and development, etc. This is crucial given that economic reconstruction rarely 
takes place in isolation and is typically part of a broader policy agenda which includes state 
building and peace building. 
To date, these aspects of economic reconstruction have not received the attention they 
deserve. Our central argument is that the array of actors involved in economic reconstruction 
efforts face different incentives and constraints which influence their ability to effectively design 
and implement economic reforms and reconstruction projects. These constraints exist in all 
economic reconstruction efforts, but become increasingly complex and relevant in cases where 
conflict is still ongoing such as Afghanistan and Iraq.   
We identify four main ‘reconstruction traps’ which often hamper efforts to rebuild 
economies amidst conflict. These traps include: (1) the credible commitment trap, (2) the 
knowledge trap, (3) the political economy trap, and (4) the bureaucracy trap. In order to illustrate 
the dynamics of each trap, we draw from a variety of experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Avoiding these traps is critical for success in economic reconstruction so we discuss potential 
strategies for avoiding them in current and future reconstruction efforts.  
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In what follows, we dedicate a section to each of these four economic reconstruction 
traps. We discuss the dynamics of each trap and also consider strategies to avoid the pitfalls 
created by these traps. The final section concludes with the implications of our analysis. 
 
4.2   The Credible Commitment Trap 
 
The credible commitment problem can be understood as follows. Without a binding and credible 
commitment to economic reforms (e.g. reconstruction projects or fundamental changes to fiscal, 
monetary trade, or regulatory policies), some reconstruction officials may have the incentive to 
change course in the future.
49
 If this is the case, then economic reforms will be time inconsistent.  
Time inconsistency of reforms results in regime uncertainty—the instability of rules and 
institutions over time—which threatens the likelihood of success in broader efforts to end 
conflict and reconstruct the economies of war-torn societies.   
The credible commitment problem has been identified as one of the most significant 
impediments to effective post-conflict economic reconstruction (Coyne and Boettke, 2009; 
Flores and Nooruddin, 2009). As we discuss below, the credible commitment trap may emerge 
because the operational environment is inherently dynamic. The inability to make a credible 
commitment may also be a function of the complexity caused by the interactions of multiple 
reformers (e.g. U.S. military officials, Afghan national government officials, aid organization 
officials, local warlords, etc.), some of which may perceive that they must change their strategies 
given new developments or have competing objectives. 
 
                                                 
49
 As Acemoglu and Robinson (2006: 193) explain, credibility becomes an issue when there is a disjoint between  
those holding power and the beneficiaries of announced reforms because those holding power may renege on their  
vocalized intent in later periods and beneficiaries have limited recourse when they do so. 
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4.2.1   The Credible Commitment Problem 
 
To illustrate the dynamics of the credible commitment trap, consider that regime uncertainty has 
hindered economic reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. As oft-cited examples, in Iraq, 
the initial governing authority—the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)— reneged on an 
economic reform regarding the privatization of state owned enterprises (SOEs) after seeing how 
the initial privatization subsequently affected unemployment and the economy in general. While 
essentially unintended, this reform reversal likely led many Iraqi citizens and local political 
authorities to question the legitimacy of future economic reforms announced by the CPA.   
In the case of Afghanistan, constant changes to the general policy environment by the 
military occupiers have contributed to fundamental and widespread uncertainty on the part of 
Afghan leaders and citizens. As Stewart (2010) explains: 
We [the U.S. and its allies] armed militias in 2001, disarmed them through a 
demobilization program in 2003, and rearmed them again in 2006 as community 
defense forces. We allowed local autonomy in 2001, pushed for a strong central 
government in 2003, and returned to decentralization in 2006.  First we tolerated 
opium crops; then we proposed to eradicate them through aerial spraying; now we 
expect to live with opium production for decades. 
 
This lack of commitment to a particular policy framework, while necessary for a dynamic 
and flexible approach to economic reconstruction amidst conflict, can inadvertently hinder the 
credibility of future policies of foreign governments and international organizations.
50
 Such 
drastic changes in policy imply that both the Afghan national government and foreign reformers 
will be seen as lacking commitment to a continuous policy regime. In the context of an ongoing 
insurgency, credible commitments to reforms become incredibly difficult because there are 
multiple reconstruction officials and domestic political authorities vested with decision making 
                                                 
50
 As described by Stewart (2010), “Frustrated by a lack of progress, the U.S. and its allies have oscillated giddily 
between contradictory policies [in Afghanistan].  The British government that once championed more generous 
budgetary support for the Kabul government now portrays it as corrupt, semi-criminal, ineffective, and illegitimate.” 
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power. External policymakers and military occupiers can be construed as one set of reformers 
while domestic political leaders, local power brokers, and insurgents at the national and local 
levels are another. The dispersion of policy decision making power among different 
reconstruction officials and political authorities makes avoiding the credible commitment trap 
that much more difficult because determining and establishing the appropriate incentives for 
reformers at each level is an extremely difficult task. Regime uncertainty on the part of one 
group of policy makers can make credible commitments to reforms by other groups of policy 
makers tenuous.   
Along with fragmentation in policy decision making power, social fragmentation also 
complicates the ability of different reconstruction officials to make credible commitments to a 
specific policy regime. Consider that in Iraq, successful economic reforms needed to satisfy 
members of Iraq’s major ethnic groups—the Arabs and the Kurds—and religious groups—Shi’a 
and Sunni Muslims. In reality, the situation is even more complex given that there are various 
intra-group factions in the broader Sunni and Shi’a groups in Iraq at both the national and local 
levels (Fearon 2007). This is also the case with Afghanistan’s ethnic groups with ethnic 
Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and many other groups all comprising power in Afghan 
governance (national and local). Finding a policy consensus to which the various reformers can 
commit under ethnic fractionalization or polarization is especially daunting in these situations, as 
the commitment to a specific policy may isolate a particular ethnic group or renege on a promise 
to these individuals.  
An existing literature on reform, peace building, and aid effectiveness highlights the 
importance of domestic policy ownership (see Sobhan 2002). As put by World Bank President  
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Robert Zoellick (2008), “local ownership is key to achieving legitimacy and effectiveness.” The 
underlying idea is that without domestic buy-in and ownership, economic reforms will not stick 
and operate in the desired manner. Local policy ownership also obviates the need to coordinate 
the efforts of multiple reconstruction officials, some who have competing objectives and visions 
for economic reconstruction.   
Yet with policy decision making power dispersed among numerous domestic policy 
makers, policy ownership is still highly complex. With competing objectives even among 
different domestic political authorities, allowing for policy ownership implies that some 
economic reforms will be adopted that will be discordant with others. The problem is further 
exacerbated by ongoing conflict because reconstruction officials and citizens cannot be sure 
about what the distribution of power will be when conflict does end. This further contributes to 
the uncertainty regarding who the true ‘reformers’ are which weakens the credibility of 
announced reforms at various levels. 
As this illustrates, the credible commitment problem poses a great deal of complexity and 
uncertainty for reconstruction officials. Historically, credible commitments in Afghanistan have 
been difficult.  The problem facing foreign reconstruction officials is twofold. First, they must 
determine what exactly domestic legitimacy entails. Is legitimacy a function of the ability to 
make a credible commitment or is it moreover a problem of misaligned expectations among local 
citizens and political authorities? Second, foreign reformers have to allow for domestic 
ownership over economic reforms. This is hard enough in post-conflict settings, but ongoing 
conflict makes the challenge that much more difficult.   
While the establishment of legitimacy is seen as the main objective of counterinsurgency 
(COIN) and reconstruction operations by the U.S. military (U.S. Army/Marine Corps, 2007: 1-
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21; U.S. Department of the Army, 2008: 1-7.), supporting the legitimacy of host nations and 
promoting domestic policy ownership can be a difficult task. In order for domestic ownership to 
be established, domestic political authorities and citizens alike must have the incentives to 
coalesce around specific economic reforms. Consider that the National Solidarity Program, a 
development program implemented by the Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and 
Development with funding from a number of international donors including the World Bank, 
calls for each community to contribute ten percent toward the cost of each project (in either 
financial or labor contributions) (Isby 2010: 363). This allows for ordinary citizens to have a 
stake in each project. Citizen involvement also pressures local political authorities to become 
involved in the development and security of reconstruction projects. However, such local 
ownership assumes that that there is an incentive to not only initiate reconstruction projects, but 
also to maintain them over the long run.   
4.2.2   Strategies for Avoiding the Credible Commitment Trap 
 
Establishing the legitimacy of reconstruction officials and economic reforms is a crucial element 
of successful economic reconstruction. Yet finding solutions to the credible commitment trap is 
not simply a matter of establishing constraints on reformers. Those engaged in economic 
reconstruction efforts must simultaneously establish binding constraints on their courses of 
action and strongly signal to citizens and local political authorities that they are sincere in 
committing to their announced reforms. By doing so, repeated interactions between 
reconstruction officials and local citizens, as well as political authorities, can shift the 
equilibrium from a ‘one shot’ situation, where reformers may have the incentive to renege on 
their vocalized course of action or local citizens may not buy in to specific reforms, to an 
equilibrium of cooperation between citizens and those involved in leading reconstruction efforts.   
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Filkins (2009) describes a discussion between General Stanley McChrystal, the former 
commander of U.S. troops and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 
Afghanistan, and Abdullah Jan, a governor in Garmsir in Afghanistan, which captures the 
essence of the credible commitment problem in economic reconstruction. Abdullah Jan told Gen. 
McChrystal the following: 
Everyone in Garmsir sees that you are living in tents, and they know that you are 
going to be leaving soon. You need to build something permanent---a building. 
Because your job here is going to take years. Only then will people be persuaded 
that you are going to stay.  
 
What Jan is expressing is the importance of reformers signaling a credible commitment to a 
future course of action. Absent such a signal, citizens will not see the future course of actions 
espoused by external reformers as legitimate.   
Along with signaling credibility, reconstruction officials must seek to promote 
transparency and accountability, both within the Afghan and Iraqi national governments but also 
within their own operations. While such anti-corruption measures would be ideal if implemented 
in the first order, they clearly are not. This is likely to be due to the competing objectives of 
different reconstruction officials in the country. As a case in point, Mohammed Zia Salehi, an 
aide to the Karzai administration, was arrested on corruption charges but Karzai subsequently 
secured his release from prison. Later revelations indicated that Salehi was on the CIA’s payroll. 
As described by Filkins and Mazzetti (2010), “Mr. Salehi’s relationship with the CIA 
underscores deep contradictions at the heart of the Obama administration’s policy in 
Afghanistan, with American officials simultaneously demanding that Mr. Karzai root out the 
corruption that pervades his government while sometimes subsidizing the very people suspected 
of perpetrating it.”   
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One strategy for overcoming credible commitment problems is for reconstruction 
officials to go overboard with reforms to signal the strength of their commitment to a stable 
policy regime (see Rodrik 1989). As an example where this strategy could be relevant, consider 
the case of Iraq, where private entrepreneurship is stifled by excessive regulations and corruption 
which raise the cost of opening a business (see Gunter, 2009). In order to signal a credible 
commitment to reform and support for private enterprise, reforms could simultaneously remove 
regulations on opening and closing a business while permanently closing the agencies that had 
previously enforced those regulations. This would send a credible signal to that current reforms 
are breaking from the past given that the previous means of enforcing those regulations are no 
longer available. However, reformers must be cognizant of how ongoing conflict influences 
perceptions regarding who the true reformers are and the legitimacy of announced reforms. For 
example, if citizens are not confident that property rights will be protected after conflict ends, 
removing barriers to business and investment will do little to generate development. 
 
4.3   The Knowledge Trap 
 
Knowledge plays a pivotal role in economic reconstruction efforts. As practitioners are well-
aware, understanding the conditions at the ‘grass-roots’ level is essential for effective 
implementation of economic reforms. But acquiring, processing, and understanding this informal 
and indigenous knowledge is quite difficult, if not impossible. In the context of reconstruction, 
the knowledge trap results from the inability of reconstruction officials to have the information 
and knowledge necessary to craft context-specific reforms and policies. The assumption that 
external policy makers do have the requisite knowledge to design and implement first-best 
economic institutions in order to develop a market economy can be conceptualized as a ‘fatal 
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conceit’. Nobel Laureate F.A. Hayek (1988: 27) described the fatal conceit as the presumption 
that “man is able to shape the world around him according to his wishes.” This is precisely the 
logic underpinning recent reconstruction efforts as illustrated by Stewart (2010), who notes that 
the plans for reconstruction in Afghanistan tap into “an Enlightenment faith that there is nothing 
intrinsically intractable about Afghan culture and society and that all men can be perfected (to a 
Western ideal) through the application of reason and the laws of social science.”   
To understand the importance of the knowledge trap, consider that a key part of most 
economic reconstruction efforts is the implementation of a market economy based on a multi-
pronged plan. With such plans, it is implicitly assumed that (1) the knowledge necessary to 
effectively design a market economy can be possessed and (2) the consequences (negative or 
positive) of implementing this multi-pronged plan can be forecasted ex ante. However, attempts 
to plan and implement markets ignore the complex chain of experiments, choices, errors, and 
informal institutions which must emerge over time for functioning markets to operate. Robust 
markets are not planned, but are instead largely the result of emergent norms and institutions 
which facilitate interaction and exchange. The irony of the fatal conceit is the belief that planners 
have the sufficient information and knowledge to design and implement markets, which are 
desirable precisely because they are best able to deal with the fact that knowledge is dispersed 
and context specific (Hayek 1945).  
This is especially important considering that many actors involved in reconstruction lack 
contextual knowledge that is crucial to accomplishing the desired ends. At the beginning of 
economic reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, for instance, “governments, UN agencies, 
multinational lending institutions, universities, and NGOs were preparing concept papers on how 
to start reconstructing Afghanistan, but nobody had a clue about the country. None of the 
106 
 
agencies had the capacity or the contracts to be able to consult Afghans about their basic needs 
or development priorities” (Rashid 2009: 171), Along with the classical knowledge pitfalls of 
economic planning, the lack of historical knowledge, cultural understanding, and general 
economic reconstruction experience in general significantly hampered efforts to rebuild the 
economies of Afghanistan and Iraq.
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4.3.1   The Knowledge Problem 
 
The knowledge problem presents a significant hurdle for economic reconstruction efforts that 
take place during ongoing conflict. In general economic development practices, Pritchett and 
Woolcock (2004: 197), note that “valuable local ‘practices’--idiosyncratic knowledge of 
variables crucial to the welfare of the poor (e.g. soil conditions, weather patterns, water flows)--
get squeezed out, even lost completely, in large centralized development programs.” Stephens 
and Ottaway (2005) provide evidence for this claim in the context of reconstruction efforts in 
Afghanistan, finding that the roof designs for schools and health clinics were not sufficient to 
support snowfall during the winter season, resulting in the collapse of many. Such experiences 
are not unexpected; Pritchett and Woolcock (2004) argue that neglecting local knowledge and 
engagement can lead to technological mistakes. The difficulties in Afghanistan and Iraq have 
been further exacerbated by the lack of security, which as discussed above threatens 
infrastructure projects even where they are successful.   
Easterly (2006) argues that development efforts are led by two different groups of 
individuals: ‘planners,’ who engage in top-down administration and cannot acquire nor process 
dispersed and context-specific knowledge, and ‘searchers,’ who operate at the grass-roots level 
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  According to Isby (2010: 349), “the donors—international, governments, and NGOs—have demonstrated too 
often a willingness to embrace quick-fix solutions  and imported templates, with the context and true nature of   
Afghan society largely ignored. 
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and utilize such knowledge to engage in effective economic and social development. In the 
context of economic reconstruction, one could refer to the above failures as an inevitable 
consequence of planners-led efforts whereas one could look at the successes of Greg 
Mortenson’s construction of schools in Pakistan and Afghanistan, for instance, as a result of 
effectively utilizing the knowledge, connections, and historical experiences specific to particular 
villages and tribal elders (Mortenson and Relin 2006). 
To illustrate the overemphasis on planning that pervades economic reconstruction efforts, 
consider again the U.S. military’s counterinsurgency and stability operations field manuals, 
which inform military doctrine regarding economic reconstruction and provide a list of 
overarching institutional and macroeconomic goals.
52
 When economic reconstruction efforts take 
place during conflict, military officials are the central players given the need to secure peace. 
Therefore, it makes sense to consider the knowledge problem in the context of military led 
economic reconstruction. 
Among the military’s goals and objectives along ‘logical lines of operations’ for 
economic development are the (1) mobilization/development of local economic activity 
(manufacturing, services, agriculture); (2) initiation of contracts with local businesses to 
stimulate trade; (3) reconstruction of commercial infrastructure (banks, transportation, markets, 
currency); (4) support of broad-based economic opportunity (micro to macro development); (5) 
support of a free market economy (5-5). In the counterinsurgency field manual planning 
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 While the US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual and the Stability Operations Field Manual 
illustrate the U.S. military’s overarching macroeconomic goals in economic reconstruction efforts, the manuals are 
first and foremost geared towards counterinsurgency operations. 
108 
 
schematic, this multi-pronged plan is restoration of the “freedom to conduct lawful commerce” 
(U.S. Army/Marine Corps, 2007: 5-5).
53
 
While positing strategies and prioritizing goals for economic reconstruction is necessary 
for developing the ‘blueprint’ for donor-led planning, the implementation of these plans is 
entirely different matter. These ‘blueprints’ for reconstruction and counterinsurgency efforts, 
while laudable in the abstract, capture the essence of the knowledge trap because they 
fundamentally assume that planners can design and implement a logical and cohesive plan to 
rebuild an entire economy.
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4.3.2   Strategies for Avoiding the Knowledge Trap 
 
In order to carry out large-scale, top-down, and overarching macroeconomic reforms, exogenous 
reformers must necessarily abstract from complex context-specific intricacies such as local belief 
systems, context-specific knowledge of time and place, informal institutions, and historical 
experiences, because there is no feasible approach to accumulating this information in its 
entirety. Therefore, the only true solution to the knowledge trap is to recognize the binding 
knowledge constraints on human planning and take these lessons into account when 
contemplating or formulating future economic reconstruction efforts.  
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  Among the U.S. military’s short-term goals for post-conflict recovery include the “(1) Security [of citizens] from 
insurgent intimidation and coercion, as well as from nonpolitical violence and crime; (2) Provision for basic 
economic needs; (3) Provision of essential services, such as water, electricity, sanitation, and medical care; (4) 
Sustainment of key social and cultural institutions; and (5) Other aspects that contribute to a society’s basic quality 
of life” (U.S. Army/Marine Corps, 2007: 2-2). The military also seeks to engage in economic and infrastructure 
development (U.S. Army/Marine Corps, 2007: 1-19).  These goals are relatively more tractable vis-à-vis the set of 
goals listed for overarching economic development.  This is because (1) the knowledge required for such endeavors 
is not  as context-specific, (2) they are immediate in time frame and are more readily implementable through 
standard military chains of logistics, and (3) do not involve the level of knowledge or logistics complexity required 
for overarching economic transformation.   
54
 U.S. military planners are evidently self-aware of the shortcomings of this strategy.  Indeed, in the 
counterinsurgency field manual, it is claimed that “many commanders are unfamiliar with the tools and resources 
required for promoting economic pluralism” (8-16).  What is overlooked is whether military commanders and 
exogenous policymakers can ever possess the relevant knowledge to achieve the goals dictated by the 
counterinsurgency and stability operations field manuals.  The knowledge problem—which emphasizes the 
importance of context-specific knowledge of time and place—suggests they cannot. 
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Smaller scale reforms and actions, which make these knowledge constraints less binding 
(but not completely absent), are more likely to succeed (see Schilderman 2004). Decentralization 
of economic development efforts is especially important in Afghanistan. As noted by Rashid 
(2009: 197), “Afghanistan had always had a weak, decentralized state where the ruler governed 
through consensus over a confederation of tribes and ethnic groups.” Administering aid projects 
through the auspices of the centralized Afghan national government is likely to be ineffective 
given the historical decentralized nature of Afghanistan’s political decision making power (see 
Isby 2010). The demographics of the country also call for greater dispersion of policy decision 
making power. Afghanistan’s population of roughly 30 million people is largely scattered among 
20,000 remote, typically mountainous villages (Stewart, 2010).   
There is some evidence that smaller scale movements can be effective. In the case of  
Iraq, for instance, Berman, Felter and Shapiro (2009) find that the violence-reducing effect of the  
$2.9 billion in American reconstruction funds allocated through the Commander's Emergency  
Response Program (CERP) was found to be particularly effective after the troop surge. These 
funds were essentially allocated for small-scale projects and were at the discretion of military 
commanders. Because the surge led to an operational change in the way troops were deployed—
for instance, greater forward operating base deployment and communication with indigenous 
actors—this led to a greater understanding of communities’ needs and therefore a greater 
reduction in violence was seen after the change in tactics. CERP funds have also been 
administered in Afghanistan. Between fiscal years 2003 and 2009, CERP funds increased from 
$40 million to $683 million (Isby 2010: 358).   
Of course, smaller-scale reforms and actions are less likely to influence the overarching 
framing of economic reconstruction efforts (Lyons 2009) yet a greater reliance on indigenous 
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action may produce more effective results. Another strategy is to incorporate local citizens into 
the reconstruction design and process. By allowing those individuals with theknowledge (and 
incentives) specific to the contextual environment to lead reconstruction efforts, this can bypass 
the incapacity of planners to implement reforms and may also help to overcome the problems 
with domestic legitimacy and ownership associated with the credible commitment problem. In 
many cases, these individuals possess local knowledge of the language, culture, and history of 
the region and typically are seen as legitimate in the eyes of the citizens in these regions. 
Further,they understand the channels of logistics and have connections with fellow citizens. This 
can also mitigate aid ‘blowback’ where negative and violent unintended consequences may 
emerge after the initiation of reconstruction reforms.  
The U.S. military has recognized the importance of local integration by the launching of  
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. Allowing citizens, elders, and local 
government officials operating at the grass-roots to engage with individuals from NGOs, IGOs, 
and multinational corporations can lead to increased sharing of knowledge, ideas, beliefs, values, 
and feasible approaches to economic reconstruction. Yet problems have been noted with the 
increased employment of PRTs throughout the country. According to Isby (2010: 356), “…in 
more secure provinces, PRTs are sometimes duplicating Afghan government functions or 
competing with local officials. In November 2008, President Karzai complained that PRTs were 
creating a “parallel government” to his own in the countryside, and other Afghans perceived that 
many of the resources devoted to some PRTs were absorbed by multiple layers of contractors 
and sub-contractors, foreign and Afghan, so that little actually reached the grassroots.” 
In Afghanistan, a national development plan called the National Solidarity Program has 
proven to be highly successful (Rashid 2009: 184). The program allowed for committees in 
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communities across the country to assess development priorities and were then allocated small 
grants (around $30-60 thousand) for the implementation of development projects. As Rashid 
(2009: 185) illustrates, NGOs involved with the program “…helped villagers with the decision 
making process and in building projects such as digging wells and reservoirs and building 
bridges and schools.” This decentralized approach to economic development is likely to be more 
successful given that it taps into the local knowledge of around 20,000 Community Development 
Councils (Zoellick 2008).  As described by Miliband (2010), “[The village councils] have not 
just designed but implemented almost 40,000 development projects, and are now forming, from 
the bottom up, district councils.” In addition to ameliorating the knowledge trap, this also aids in 
securing areas of the country because local citizens and political authorities have the incentive to 
maintain order and resist insurgents.  
 
4.4   The Political Economy Trap 
 
In conflict-stricken societies, economic reconstruction is one part of the broader strategy to 
eventually end conflict. However, economic reconstruction does not take place in isolation as 
economic and political reconstruction efforts are inextricably linked. For instance, if political 
institutions are characterized by corruption and unchecked power, this will stifle economic 
activity because property rights may be insufficiently protected or the regulatory hurdles 
(including bribes) to exchange, investment, and innovation may be too significant for local 
citizens or firms to overcome. Conversely, success (or failure) in different economic sectors may 
generate different political impulses by local citizens (e.g. support for less or more free trade, 
levels of redistribution, etc.). The implementation of economic reforms within the context of 
political agreements is especially difficult (Del Castillo 2001). The political economy trap refers 
to the idealized view of politics and democracy which pervades reconstruction efforts. This view 
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assumes that political and economic goals are compatible and neglects the tradeoff between 
democratic and economic outcomes. Further, this view overemphasizes the benefits of 
democratic political systems while understating the potential costs of such systems on economic 
reconstruction efforts.  
4.4.1   The Tradeoff Between Democracy and Economic Goals 
 
The political economy trap can adversely affect economic reconstruction in several key ways.  
First, the idealized view of democracy overlooks the fact that unchecked democracy can produce 
a variety of negative outcomes. While reformers typically develop a comprehensive list of targets 
and goals to attain related to the establishment of democratic political systems in conflict torn 
countries (e.g. the holding of elections), implementation must be carefully performed. For 
instance, Flores and Nooruddin (2009: 5) find that “countries that undergo extensive 
democratization in the immediate postconflict period recover more slowly than countries that do 
not.” This may be because “typically early elections in a highly polarized society empower elites, 
senior military leaders, and organized criminal elements” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2008: 
1-18). This highlights how important the proper consolidation of democracy and institutions is 
for effective economic reconstruction, especially where conflict is still ongoing. 
 Absent effective constraints, democracy can produce illiberal outcomes—political, 
economic, and legal—that can do significant harm to efforts to foster economic reconstruction. 
When analyzing donor-led reconstruction goals in Afghanistan, Montgomery (2004: 36) 
illustrates some of the democracy-economic tradeoffs as such: 
(1) the rule of law can degenerate into the rule of lawyers--litigious, costly, and 
dilatory; (2) economic efficiency can turn into profligacy--piratical and predatory; 
(3) free speech can reward superficiality and extremism; (4) the demand for 
unfulfilled rights can invite invidious reverse discrimination; (5) checked-and-




The above five factors shed light on the need to establish effective constraints to ensure that 
reconstruction efforts result in stable political and economic orders. Yet creating these checks 
and balances is by no means a simple task, and social scientists and practitioners typically lack 
the knowledge of how to design effective comprehensive constitutional rules that will stick over 
the long run. This is because formal institutions, such as constitutions, must be grounded in 
informal customs and belief systems, which are largely beyond the reach of policy (North 2005; 
Boettke, Coyne and Leeson 2008). Where there is a disconnect between existing informal 
institutions and desired formal institutions, the latter will not be viewed as legitimate by citizens 
further contributing to the credible commitment trap discussed earlier.  
Second, the idealized view of democracy often leads outsiders to overlook the tensions 
that may exist between the dual goals of establishing democratic political institutions and 
constructing the foundations of a market economy. These tensions may preclude the emergence 
of large-scale and first-best reforms; for instance, the privatization of state-owned enterprises or 
the removal of all tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade may not occur because powerful interests 
drive policy efforts in the other direction. Allowing for self-determination through democracy 
can lead to demands by citizens that run counter to the free market economic plans often 
envisioned by reformers. When this happens, it presents a conundrum because implementing 
reconstruction plans requires either preventing democratic participation or ignoring the results.  
For instance, when the highest ranking Shi’a Muslim scholar in Iraq, Grand Ayatollah al 
Sistani, issued a fatwa calling for general elections in June 2003, this led the CPA to ultimately 
abandon plans to appoint a body to construct a national constitution (Wong 2004). This had real 
effects on economic outcomes since the CPA was unable to have oversight over the writing of a 
constitution that could have provided a foundation for a permanent government, which would 
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have led to stability and the encouragement of economic activity, which was viewed as a central 
aspect of the counter-insurgency strategy. Third, the overly optimistic view of democracy can 
lead to a neglect of the status quo. This happens because in assuming the ideal reformers often 
lose focus of the realities of the situation they face. Buchanan (1975) emphasizes that all reforms 
must start from the ‘here and now’ by recognizing the status quo and the associated constraints. 
The status quo refers to the array of existing formal and informal institutions, economic and 
political actors, and other particularities of post-conflict settings. Focus on the ideal, and the 
resulting failure to appreciate the status quo, has contributed to the failure of various 
reconstruction efforts. One well-known example can be found in Iraq where, instead of 
rebuilding governmental institutions from scratch, the CPA implemented a process of de-
Ba’athification through the existing government apparatus. The intent of this policy was to 
minimize disruptions to the government’s provision of services following the 2003, U.S.-led 
invasion. Yet as Allawi (2007: 161-2) explains, this proved problematic as the CPA did not have 
enough competent staff to operate the government. Hence, the lack of appreciation for the status 
quo—i.e. the recognition and understanding of pre-invasion governance structures and the 
associated binding constraints—has contributed to significant hurdles for economic 
reconstruction efforts in Iraq. 
The status quo in both Afghanistan and Iraq also involved ongoing conflict, corruption, 
and power vacuums, which has made attempts to achieve both political and economic 
reconstruction that much more difficult. As in the case of the credible commitment problem, 
violent insurgencies in these countries have created uncertainty regarding the final distribution of 
political power. This political complexity has contributed to uncertainty regarding the dynamics 
of economic institutions and modes of coordination. Local citizens may be less likely to coalesce 
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around economic reforms and reconstruction projects if their political demands lead them to join 
the ongoing insurgencies.  
4.4.2   Strategies for Avoiding the Political Economy Trap 
 
Those tasked with carrying out reconstruction efforts must be cognizant of the tradeoff between 
democratic goals and economic outcomes. The focus must be shifted away from the idealized 
view of democracy and towards finding ways to implement effective constraints on political 
decision makers to ensure that economic reconstruction efforts are not in conflict with political 
behaviors. However, given the uncertainty due to ongoing conflict, this can be difficult to 
accomplish. Recognizing, understanding, and appreciating the status quo and the associated 
constraints in post-conflict regions will provide a sounder foundation from which to implement 
policies.   
Given the democracy-economy tradeoff, one possible strategy for overcoming the 
political economy trap is to prioritize political reconstruction over economic reconstruction or 
vice versa. For instance, del Castillo (2008: 41) argues that “should a conflict arise between 
peace (political) and development (economic) objectives, the first one should be paramount at all 
times. Because peace is a precondition for sustainable development, all actors should recognize 
and accept that political priorities will often constrain economic policymaking.” According to 
General James Conway, Commandant of the Marine Corps, in fielding a question regarding the 
conditions that would be suitable for a significant troop withdrawal:   
...a military force shapes the environment. We can't fix the economy, we can't fix 
the government. What we can do is affect the security. Now we can aid in these 
other things, but, for all intents and purposes, we shape the environment that 
allows these other lines of operations...to take place. Initially, in both Iraq now 
and in Afghanistan, we've had to do that at the start by ourselves. But 
increasingly, our doctrine calls for turning that over to host nation security 
forces...that's why we are partnering right now almost on every patrol with the 
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Afghan security forces...that's why we want to posture the police so they can be 
successful...transitioning host nation forces to the point that they can do those 
things...when we think that we have sufficiently beaten down the insurgency in 
the area, we have sufficiently built up the Afghan capability to deal with what's 
there...then I think we have done the essence of what we were sent there to do 
(CSPAN 2010).  
 
In some sense, the cessation of conflict and the promotion of security of person and property 
may very well be necessary and sufficient conditions to allow for economic growth and 
development. It should be realized that this approach places limits on the scale and scope of 
economic reconstruction efforts and implies that large-scale, first-best economic reforms are 
unlikely to be effective since they are more likely to conflict with political and security 
objectives. This can be problematic considering the historical and contemporary influences of 
conflict on human and social capital.  This tension between political and economic goals is likely 
to be even greater in instances of ongoing conflict as efforts are focused on ending violence and 
securing peace given the uncertainty of the distribution of political power and nature and stability 
of political institutions. 
 
4.5   The Bureaucracy Trap 
 
There are appreciable limits to implementing economic reconstruction goals through 
bureaucratic channels. There have been scathing critiques of reconstruction efforts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq due to the lack of effective planning and cross-coordination among 
different agencies and reconstruction officials. There have also been numerous reports of 
corruption, waste, nepotism, and inefficiency, both on the part of the Afghan and Iraqi national 
governments but also by foreign reconstruction officials. For example, Stephens and Ottaway 
(2005) have documented the progress of a program to construct Afghan schools and health 
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clinics, finding that the program suffered from a lack of coordination and poor planning due in 
part to the desire to have something completed before the 2004 Afghan presidential elections.  
These inherent inefficiencies have led to continued calls for “improved coordination” and 
“better planning” on the part of bureaus. For instance, the U.S. Army’s stability operations field 
manual (2008: 1-3) calls for ‘unity of effort’ among the array of actors involved in a stability 
operation, including the “synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of 
governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.” 
However, this focus on ‘streamlining’ bureaucracies places disproportionate emphasis on the role 
of bureaucracy in reconstruction efforts while neglecting the key role played by ordinary citizens 
acting in an entrepreneurial manner to solve the problems facing post-conflict societies. The 
bureaucracy trap emerges when there is an overreliance on bureaucracies in economic 
reconstruction efforts. Avoiding this trap therefore involves an understanding of the industrial 
organization of bureaucracies, including the incentives and constraints faced by bureaucrats, as 




4.5.1   Bureaucracy and Economic Reconstruction 
 
Agencies engaged in economic reconstruction efforts receive their budgets from an array of 
government actors. Budgets are allocated based on relationships with these actors, as well as on 
the logistical and compensatory needs of each bureau. Yet financial resources are scarce and 
each bureau is therefore competing with other agencies over a limited budget. The incentives 
created by this process result in predictable behaviors among those working in these 
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  There is an array of bureaucracies involved in post-conflict economic reconstruction including government 
agencies, IGOs and NGOs.  Although our analysis could be applied to any of these organizations, we limit our focus 
to government agencies since they are typically the largest bureaucracies involved in economic reconstruction and 
usually play the largest role in terms of planning, implementation and oversight of reconstruction plans. 
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bureaucracies and these behaviors influence the process of economic reconstruction in a number 
of ways. 
First, bureaus involved in economic reconstruction efforts will attempt to receive the 
largest possible share of financial resources and the associated influence over reconstruction 
efforts. This typically involves investing resources in signaling the relative importance of one 
bureau over others. Second, this intrinsically creates an important tension in reconstruction 
efforts: agencies should be united in the common goals of reconstruction (e.g. security, 
amelioration of poverty, infrastructural development, etc.) yet they are instead competing with 
one another for funds and influence. This often leads to efforts to develop a specialization that 
differentiates one agency from the others in order to receive a larger part of the fixed budget. 
Each bureau has its own agenda, which may clash with the agendas of other agencies as well as 
with the overarching goal of successful economic reconstruction. Third, bureaus will tend to 
exhaust their entire budgets while continually seeking financial appropriations in order to 
increase the size and scope of the agency. The failure of a bureau to spend its allocated budget 
typically leads to budget reductions in subsequent years. This creates the incentive to ensure that 
budgets are exhausted even if wasteful expenditures are necessary to achieve this outcome. This 
inherently runs counter to ensuring that reconstruction costs are minimized while the benefits to 
the citizens are maximized. This waste is magnified by the lack of adequate feedback 
mechanisms in bureaucratic settings making it difficult for bureaucrats to accurately gauge the 
effective allocation, and reallocation, of resources to high-return uses (Mises 1983). Lastly, 
bureaucracies are typically judged on the basis of readily observable outputs which do not 
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These four factors have had substantial impacts on reconstruction efforts in Iraq and  
Afghanistan. For instance, infighting for control over Iraq reconstruction policy between the  
U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. State Department became highly acrimonious (Phillips  
2005: 7). Diamond (2005: 28-9) claims that “a number of U.S. government agencies had a 
variety of visions of how political authority would be reestablished in Iraq. In the bitter, 
relentless infighting among U.S. government agencies in advance of the war, none of these 
preferences clearly prevailed.”  
Yet another factor affecting the capacity for bureaucracies to effectively engage in 
economic reconstruction is decision making and the flow of information within these 
organizational structures. Bureaucratic rules tend to be rigid in nature which often prevents 
flexibility to rapidly changing conditions. This poses a problem for economic reconstruction 
efforts which typically take place in the context of uncertainty and constant change—especially 
in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, where violent insurgencies are still ongoing. As Rondinelli 
(2004: 12) explains, “Many of the decisions about how to promote the development of 
Afghanistan are likely to be made rapidly, reactively, and in response to uncertain and ever-
changing political forces. Careful deliberation is likely to be in short supply in the face of rapidly 
changing political trends and complex social and cultural conditions in Afghanistan.” 
To provide a concrete example of this logic, consider the economic reconstruction of 
Iraq, where bureaucratic waste and inefficiency have been magnified as a result of the absence of 
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  According to Rashid (2009: 177), at the beginning of economic reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, “Quick 
impact projects became a Washington favorite.   These were swift and cheap, such as digging a well, rebuilding a 
small bridge, or repairing a broken-down school building, and were supposed to convince the population that 
reconstruction was moving ahead.  Instead, such projects invariably helped only the local warlord or commander the 
CIA was supporting.”   
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effective feedback and accountability mechanisms (Glanz 2006). Specifically, consider the $644 
million “Community Stabilization Program” (CSP) in Iraq, which was suspended due to 
significant fraud and waste. An audit by the USAID’s Inspector General found that some of the 
funds allocated specifically for weakening the insurgency actually went to insurgents, as well as 
to corrupt community leaders and CSP representatives (USAID Office of the Inspector General, 
2008: 8). As another example, consider that a more recent audit published in July 2010 found 
that that U.S. Department of Defense was unable to property account for 96% of the $9.1 billion 
funds it has received since 2004 through the Development Fund for Iraq for reconstruction 
activities (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2010). 
In Afghanistan, the story has not been much different. The United States spent around 
$860 million on police training, with Rashid (2009: 205) concluding that the “results were 
almost totally useless.” This is because “DynCorp [a State Department contractor] was training 
the police to fight an insurgency rather than win hearts and minds in their localities.” The actions 
of the local police thereafter were observed to be as “rapacious” as they were before (Rashid 
2009: 205).  According to the former finance minister of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani, 
“International technical assistance is considered to be largely wasted…hundreds of millions of 
dollars have gone into technical assistance only to increase corruption and misgovernance” (Isby 
2010: 334). 
4.5.2   Strategies for Avoiding the Bureaucracy Trap 
 
The overemphasis on improving coordination and planning within and between bureaus ignores 
the constraints on what bureaucracies can actually achieve in economic reconstruction during 
conflict. Coordination is a necessary but insufficient condition for successful economic 
reconstruction because real constraints exist on bureaucratic activity no matter what the level of 
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coordination. Perhaps more importantly, this focus puts unrealistic faith in increased bureaucratic 
central planning, which is the very antithesis of the free markets that reconstruction authorities 
seek to engender through economic reconstruction.   
The bureaucracy trap illustrates that overreliance on bureaus to coordinate reconstruction 
efforts can hamper economic growth and development. The main concern is that the central 
planning associated with bureaucracy results in the systematic disregard for the capacity of 
ordinary citizens and ‘searchers’ to act entrepreneurially to find solutions for the problems of 
economic reconstruction. One example of the power of private initiative is the mobile phone 
industry in Iraq (The Economist, 2009). With 20 million subscribers in a county of 27 million 
citizens, mobile phones have become a tool of commerce and have allowed for greater 
interpersonal communication. According to Isby (2010: 343), in Afghanistan “communications 
and the spread of cell phones have proven a great success, funded almost exclusively by the 
private sector, and has managed to avoid corruption. This was largely carried out by Afghans 
working in the private sector, borrowing money and acquiring technology from outside as 
required, rather than relying on donor nations.” While many reconstruction activities must 
inherently be dealt with through bureaucratic channels, it is critical to realize the limits of 
bureaucratic activity and the importance of private initiative and decentralization for sustainable 
economic recovery. 
 
4.6   Conclusion 
 
The overarching implication of our analysis is that there are significant constraints on what 
economic reconstruction can accomplish. These constraints are even more significant in cases of 
ongoing conflict and insurgency since this context contributes to additional tensions between 
political and military actors, as well as citizens. Reconstruction amidst violence places the 
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military at the core of the reconstruction effort and leads to a tension in various goals and 
strategies which often leads to outcomes which run counter to the goals of economic 
reconstruction. Moreover, the involvement of the military in economic reconstruction stretches 
military personnel beyond their comparative advantage—the use of force—and asks them to act 
on knowledge and information which they cannot possibly possess. 
The economic reconstruction traps put forth in this paper indicate that the first-best, and 
often the second- and third-best policies, will not be realistic given the incentives, constraints, 
and knowledge limitations inherent to economic reconstruction efforts. This implication may be 
apparent, but as the many examples discussed in this paper indicate, actual efforts to engage in 
economic reconstruction amidst conflict tend to neglect these traps and the resulting constraints. 
The failure to appreciate the traps of economic reconstruction sheds light on many of the failures 
in Afghanistan and Iraq to date and provide insight into what should be avoided in future efforts 
in similar settings. 
Finally, we must point out that another possibility not captured in our analysis is that the 
failure of economic reconstruction may not be due specifically to the traps discussed above, but 
rather because of inappropriate or irrelevant strategies and policies underpinning the initial 
occupation and reconstruction. Our analysis indicates that even under a first-best scenario, where 
the initial occupation and reconstruction is legitimate and based on sound strategies and policies, 
the desired end of economic reconstruction may not be achieved due to some combination of the 
four reconstruction traps. If we ease this assumption and recognize that inappropriate policies 
and strategies may underpin the initial occupation and reconstruction, this provides even more 
reason to be skeptical that economic reconstruction officials will be successful in achieving their 
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